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Abstract

This research focuses on urban water policy. The three papers extend the literature through economic application, taking theory in a direction that informs water
resource managers on optimal decision-making or a better approach to management.
Three primary results are: ﬁrst, that the optimal infrastructure investment path is
impacted by existing capital stock, water policy, and the size of the customer base
served. Second, optimally managed, optimally priced urban groundwater mitigates
aquifer drawdown and generates excess revenue that may be used for capital investment. Third, to achieve water conservation through non-price methods, managers
should use a neighborhood, community-organized approach.
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Water systems across the United States need money for infrastructure repair and
replacement. Utility level investment needs are grounded in existing infrastructure
that is nearing the end of its economic life in a time of unparalleled population
growth, suggesting that optimal investment should reﬂect the same. Chapter 2
presents a model that develops the optimal investment decision and uses two-stage
least squares to test it. Consistent with model predictions, the empirical results show
how the eﬀects of population, capital, and existing policy inﬂuence infrastructure
investment. The estimates indicate that per capita stock has a lagged impact on
per capita investment and that increasing new customer connection costs reduces
investment need more than increasing water rates to existing customers.
Western U.S. water supplies are increasingly scarce due to, among other things,
population growth and climate change. These two realities imply that increased
scarcity may lead to over-consumption, premature resource exhaustion, and shortages. Chapter 3 develops a hydro-economic model of social welfare maximization
constrained by water availability. The model provides optimal water use and the
eﬃcient price. A dynamic simulation model suggests that, for Albuquerque, New
Mexico, current water prices are 20 percent of the price level that includes scarcity
value. Investing the scarcity value in water infrastructure is one way to overcome
regulatory pricing barriers and allocate water eﬃciently thus solving two problems
with a single policy-prescription.
Scarcity requires residents of arid, heavily populated regions of the U.S. to increase water conservation or face the consequence of shortfalls. As an impure public
good, conserved water is subject to free-riding behavior. Chapter 4 considers a demand side, non-price management alternative to promote water conservation. Using
experimental economics, this paper explores the extent to which community interaction impacts consumption. In a context rich, induced value environment participants
are asked to allocate water between their group’s public source and private use. Three

ix

treatments vary group size, information, and communication to simulate actions a
water manager could take to promote conservation. The results show that small
group size and communication promote conservation, but the role of information is
mixed.
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Chapter 1
Urban Water Policy

Urban water policy makers in the western United States face a predicament from uncertain futures on three fronts. These include ageing water infrastructure, increasing
demand for water in multiples uses, and more frequent and more intense occurrence
of drought. Aging water infrastructure implies the replacement costs will be substantial and come due within the next 30 years (Cromwell et al., 2001). Population
demographics, diﬀerent from which water infrastructure was originally designed to
serve, implies that system expansion will be needed. Meeting the supply challenges
of a growing population proves problematic for systems in arid climates struggling
to meet the water needs of existing populations. These, coupled with reduced water
supplies, have water managers asking the question, “Can we have it [scarce water
resources and population growth] all?”1 Managers are thus left with a balancing act
between water scarcity and population growth fueled by economic expansion.
This research contributes to the water resource and economics literatures through
1 For

example the Arizona Hydrological Society and Southwest Hydrologists recently
held a symposium; “2007 Regional Water Symposium, Sustainable Water, Unlimited
Growth, Quality of Life: Can We Have It All?” Tucson, Arizona, 30 August 2007, to
address such issues.
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three research papers. The ﬁrst paper, Chapter 2, develops a path of optimal water
infrastructure investment by extending the existing infrastructure literature to specifically address water infrastructure. It applies the capital accumulation model from
the macroeconomics literature to reveal the optimal, water infrastructure investment
path. Chapter 3 presents a model for the optimal extraction of scarce, groundwater
resources given a population growth rate and then postulates the extent to which
charging water’s scarcity value defrays the investment gap. This paper extends the
groundwater management literature by applying a model that was ﬁrst used to investigate water policy for agriculture. The results extend the understanding of scarcity
priced water by showing the extent to which aquifer drawdown is mitigated. Chapter
4 explores the customer’s water consumption–conservation decision in an experimental context using treatments an urban manager may implement. The ﬁndings extend
the experimental economics literature by adapting the standard public goods framework to allow for conservation. This extends the water management literature since
it suggests a new approach to achieve water conservation.
The sections that follow here provide a summary of the research in each paper.
These sections outline in more detail the need for better, more eﬃcient water policy
pertinent to the three areas of focus. The methodology is discussed followed by a
summary of the results.

1.1

Infrastructure

One challenge to on water resources managers is from antiquated infrastructure.
Distribution and transmission mains that were placed into service as long ago as the
end of the nineteenth century are now at the end, or will soon reach the end, of their
economic usefulness. Old pipes, made of cast iron, steel, and reinforced concrete are
speckled with leaks which create water loss and lead to deleterious health eﬀects.

2
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Estimates of annual U.S. water loss from leaking pipes reach as much as 1.7 trillion
gallons. That is enough water to supply a city of 25.9 million people for an entire
year (EPA, 2007).2 Further, the loss in water pressure due to leaks has been linked to
gastrointestinal illness since low water pressure reduces water quality by increasing
the potential for contamination (EPA, 2007).
Failing water infrastructure is part of a larger U.S. infrastructure problem. The
American Society of Civil Engineers periodically reviews the state of U.S. infrastructure. In the 2009 report, drinking water infrastructure was given a ‘D-’ grade
(ASCE, 2009). No other infrastructure type ranked lower. In part, this is due to
water infrastructure that has not needed replacement since pipes were installed with
suﬃcient quality that only now are they wearing out. Now, pipes across the U.S.
need to be replaced leading some to call the next 20 years the “Dawn of the Replacement Era” (Cromwell et al., 2001). Others have estimated the size of capital
investment needed to replace failing U.S. water infrastructure at $23 billion annually
and a cumulative total of up to $2 trillion by the year 2019 (WIN, 2000a,b). Failing
water infrastructure is problematic since the breadth of general, U.S. infrastructure
failure means that Federal assistance at the local level may be limited. This leaves
water infrastructure challenges to be dealt with at the utility level.
To date, the economics literature has treated water infrastructure as a subset
of social infrastructure which includes energy, schools, and transportation. As water infrastructure needs increase, the economics literature on water infrastructure
will continue to burgeon, a ﬁeld to which Chapter 2 contributes. Optimal water
infrastructure investment, modeled at the level of a water utility, sheds light on
which factors inﬂuence the investment decision in terms of exogenous parameters
and variables that a water resources manager may control. The model thus informs
water resource managers how to approach a more optimal path of infrastructure
2 This

assume 180 gallons daily per capita consumption.
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investment. This research ﬁts with the Best Management Practices that the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency identiﬁes as one of four in the Sustainable Water Infrastructure Initiative (EPA, 2006) since it provides managers information on
better infrastructure management.
Chapter 2 develops a model that uses optimal control theory to set up a water utility’s investment decision. The utility’s infrastructure investment decision is
one that minimizes utility costs.3 The model explicitly considers exogenous input
and output costs with endogenous changes in system capacity and investment. Investment, the control variable, is optimally chosen over a ﬁxed time horizon. The
theoretical model produces four noteworthy results. The optimal investment decision
is a function of three eﬀects: the population eﬀect, the capital stock eﬀect, and the
policy eﬀect. Moreover, the model illustrates that infrastructure investment is costly
to the utility, that there is an opportunity cost of investment which the utility must
consider on the optimal path. I use a two-stage least squares econometric estimation
to test the theoretical model.
The empirical model relies on data from the American Water Works Association (AWWA), which conducts the Water and Wastewater Rate Survey (AWWA,
2004, 2006). The AWWA surveys water and wastewater systems in the U.S. and 29
countries concerning such things as utility costs, system characteristics, and water
system needs. I use the data, from survey years 2004 and 2006, to validate the model.
The theoretical model does not control for characteristics that may vary widely for
systems outside of the U.S. Thus, the empirical model uses data from the 248 U.S.
water systems in the surveys.
I construct six empirical test that compare the theory and empirical models.
Five tests indicate that the theoretical model is consistent with the empirical model,
which suggest that theory model implications provide managers information to move
3 The

model maximizes proﬁts since by duality that is analogous to cost minimization.
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to more optimal infrastructure investment. Three eﬀects are numerically estimated.
The population eﬀect suggests that a one percent increase in population leads to
a 2.2 percent increase in investment need. The capital stock eﬀect is the reverse
of population; for a one percent increase in system capacity, investment need falls
by 2.2 percent. The policy eﬀect shows that increasing water prices on existing
rate payers may increase investment need while increasing connection costs may
reduce investment need. This result informs policy makers of where the burden of
expansion should be placed; it is more eﬃcient for new connected customers to pay
the expansion price.
Chapter 2 contributes to the economics literature as it expands the horizon of the
social infrastructure research line. The research contributes to the water resources
literature since it informs policy makers of factors that may help water resource
managers move to more optimal infrastructure investment. Identifying factors that
aﬀect the optimal decision may allow managers to mitigate investment shortfalls thus
bridging the gap between actual and needed investment.

1.2

Scarcity

A second challenge for water resource managers is increased scarcity. In a recent
summary of global climate change studies, Saunders et al. (2008) ﬁnd that temperature increase in the U.S. West is greater than in any other part of the country. The
average temperature increase is 1.7 degrees Fahrenheit but there is variation across
the West, which ranges from 2.4 in the mountain states to 2.7 in the Southwest. The
most notable, however, is Nevada where the increase is 3.6 degrees closely followed
by Colorado at 3.1 degrees. This is of particular concern in light of two points.
First, in a forthcoming report on climate change impacts to the Colorado River,
Barnett and Pierce (2009) ﬁnd that by 2050, Colorado runoﬀ will decline by up to 20
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percent. This means that nearly 90 percent of scheduled water deliveries, distributed
across seven Western states, will be missed. The second point of concern is that the
arid climate, where water scarcity is greatest, is the same region with the greatest
forecasted population growth. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates a 30-year change
in population in the U.S. West at 46 perecent; in Nevada alone the change is 114
percent. Through the ﬁrst half of this century, people living in the West are going
to have to make do with less. There simply is not enough water to support existing
water use leading Barnett and Pierce to conclude that the Colorado River is no
longer sustainable. The Colorado example illustrates that U.S. Westerners will have
to undergo a paradigm shift in their approach to water use or else face shortfalls.
Chapter 3 proposes that one way to deal with increasing water scarcity is to optimally control groundwater pumping in an urban environment. From the perspective
of social welfare maximization, the model ﬁnds optimal water pumping. Water availability, measured by water table height, constrains the social welfare function. The
model addresses the extent to which controlled pumping may reduce aquifer drawdown and generate revenue for infrastructure investment. Thus, controlled pumping
provides a water manager with a “two-for-one” solution to water scarcity and failing
infrastructure.
The methodology of the chapter is to use a theory and empirical model. The
solution to the social welfare maximization is a system of diﬀerential equations, one
of which is the path of optimal water pumping. The empirical model, a dynamic
simulation, evaluates the eﬀectiveness of controlled groundwater pumping at mitigating aquifer drawdown. The simulation requires speciﬁc functional forms for water
demand and water utility production costs. I econometrically estimate these, apply
the model to Albuquerque, New Mexico, and simulate the model over a 40-year time
horizon on a monthly time step.
I estimated the model with data from the Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water
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Utility Authority. The data is of total revenue and total water production across the
utility for 1994 through 2004. I use the econometric parameter estimates, aquifer
height data, and population data to initialize the simulation model. Aquifer height
data is from the U.S. Geological Survey for a monitoring site near the center of
Albuquerque. The population data is from the Bureau of Business and Economic
Research at the University of New Mexico. Prior to running the simulation model,
I calibrate it to existing aquifer height and population data such that the model
replicates the raw data.
A management type that increases price at the rate of inﬂation serves as a reference to which I compare controlled groundwater pumping; I assume three percent
inﬂation. I ﬁnd that the controlled pumping solution preserves 21.6 feet of aquifer
height at the terminal time over the alternative. The simulated population uses 522
acre-feet less per month under the controlled pumping approach. The results are
sensitive to the population growth rate. The base case population growth rate is 1.2
percent; a one-half percent growth rate leads to a seven foot diﬀerence in aquifer
height and a three percent growth rate leads to a diﬀerence of 64 feet.
Controlled groundwater pumping maps into a path of optimal water prices. The
mapping reveals a marginal user cost, which is the opportunity cost of foregone
water use. That is, it is the cost borne to users in all future periods because of
water used today. I ﬁnd that current water prices are 20 percent of the level that
reﬂects the marginal user cost. This information is useful for water managers who
wish to set water prices to reﬂect the scarcity value of the resource and thus use it
eﬃciently. Further, charging the scarcity value generates signiﬁcantly greater proﬁts
at the end of the time horizon than the alternative. The implication is that charging
water prices that reﬂect the scarcity value mitigate aquifer drawdown and produces
revenue, which a manager may use for infrastructure investment.
These results do not allow me to speak to an optimal population growth rate.

7

Chapter 1. Urban Water Policy

However, they do suggest that for managers who have to manage an increasingly
scarce resource concomitantly to major changes in population, prices that reﬂect
the marginal user cost signiﬁcantly preserve the resource. Scarcity pricing generates
revenue with which infrastructure repairs may be addressed. A water resource manager thus has a “two-for-one” solution to water scarcity and infrastructure failure by
simply charging a water price that reﬂects the marginal user cost. The economists’
long-sounding battle cry for increased water prices is justiﬁed; marginal user cost
pricing successfully signals scarcity.

1.3

Conservation

Increased water scarcity means that, in addition to eﬃcient water prices, resource
managers may need additional tools to achieve water sustainability thus meeting
multiple water demands. Urban water managers have to reconcile the fact that there
are environmental, recreational, cultural, and agricultural entities that have water
demands contemporaneous to residential customers. For water that is allocated for
urban use, excess can then be thought of as a public good since it may be used in
one of these alternative purposes or saved for future generations. To the urban user,
conserved water becomes a public good since foregone use produces a beneﬁt the
consumer may experience in ways other than consumption.
Chapter 4 models the water consumption decision of a residential customer in a
public goods framework. The model simulates a hypothetical surface water allocation to urban users. The research question is: to what extent do community factors
matter in the water use decision? That is, how do neighbor interaction, information, and group size impact consumption behavior? To answer this question, this
paper applies experimental economics and treatments that an urban water manager
may use as additional conservation-promoting mechanisms. Group size, information,
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and communication are experiment treatments that parallel demand side, non-price
management tools.
The model is tested experimentally using a protocol adapted from the voluntary
contributions mechanism (Isaac and Walker, 1988a,b; Isaac et al., 1994). The protocol is a voluntary conservation mechanism. In it, the public good is water allotment
to the group called the “Public Water Bucket.” Participants are asked to determine
how much of the public bucket they would like to place in their “Private Water
Bucket.” Participants have handouts that show the payment amount for public and
private bucket units. The public bucket payments are identical but there are three
versions of the private bucket handout. This simulates three water use types; high,
medium, and low. Consumer type high has more value in private consumption than
the medium type who in turn has more value in private consumption than the low
player type. The protocol does not control for temporal eﬀects since the experiment
is in a single-stage framework.
The three treatments, group size, information, and communication parallel management tools a water manager may implement. The group size treatment sheds light
on the issue of how conservation is best targeted, at a local neighborhood level or
city-wide level. The information treatment anonymously informs the group members
about the consumption decision of all other players in the group. The communication
treatment lets participants communicate with other group members anonymously by
writing on a group discussion board, which simulates a newsletter or other mechanism a manager could use. The experiments are populated with participants from
the English speaking, adult, Albuquerque, New Mexico population. Participants are
students from the University of New Mexico (UNM) and Albuquerque residents. All
experiments were conducted in classrooms in the Department of Economics at UNM.
The results from the group size and communication treatments indicate that a
small group size where communication is present promotes a lower water consump-
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tion decision than otherwise. The role of information is mixed; in the large group
participants’ water consumption tended to increase but decreased in the small groups.
These results are signiﬁcant since they suggest that an organized, neighborhood approach to water conservation may be more eﬀective than city-wide encouragement.
The organized community approach found here is thus another possible tool policy
makers may use on the path to promoting water sustainability.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Water-Utility
Infrastructure Investment

2.1

Introduction

A gift from previous generations, public water-infrastructure is reaching the end of
its useful economic life in cities across the United States. Infrastructure placed into
service following the population booms of the 1890s, 1920s, and 1950s has one thing
in common: it will need to be replaced within the next 30 to 40 years (Cromwell
et al., 2001). A forthcoming report by the American Society of Civil Engineers
highlights this reality with the ‘D-’ grade assigned to water infrastructure (ASCE,
2009). Infrastructure investment needs are directly related to conditions of existing
infrastructure and population size. This paper characterizes optimal infrastructure
investment, at the level of the water service-providing utility, in terms of population
size and capital stock. I model the infrastructure investment decision as a function
of the customer base and the capital stock.
Water-infrastructure has been addressed previously in the economics literature as
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a subset of social-infrastructure, which typically includes transportation, structures,
equipment, and water systems (Munnell, 1992). Social-infrastructure research has
primarily investigated the returns to infrastructure investment as a share of GDP
(Munnell, 1992; Gramlich, 1994; Rauch, 1995; Pereira, 2000). The seminal investigation (Aschauer, 1989), hypothesized that the lack of social-infrastructure investment
may have played a role in the U.S. productivity decline of the 1970s, a result later
conﬁrmed by Munnell (1990). Cummings et al. (1978) looked at the eﬀect of socialinfrastructure on wages ﬁnding that people are willing to trade oﬀ a reduction in
wages for an increase in per capita social-infrastructure stock. The U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis estimates that the value of U.S., non-military infrastructure is
$3.54 trillion dollars.1 Munnell (1992) found that of this total, the asset value of
water and sewer systems constituted 14 percent or $495.6 billion dollars. This result
is consistent with time series analysis by Pereira (2000) who found that water infrastructure investment as a share of aggregate public investment averaged 16 percent
over the time period 1956 through 1997.
Existing water-infrastructure is nearing the end of its useful economic life. Technical studies estimate the water-infrastructure replacement bill as an emerging gap
between existing investment and projected investment need. The Water Infrastructure Network (WIN) estimates the investment need, for systems to meet guidelines
of the Clean Drinking Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act, at $23 billion dollars
annually above current investment (WIN, 2000a). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that this gap ranges between $485 billion and $896
billion dollars over the period 2000 through 2019, the WIN estimates are as high as
$2 trillion dollars over the same period (WIN, 2000b; EPA, 2002b). These three studies note that both infrastructure age and the size of the population served increase
1 The

original estimate, from unpublished data at the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
in 1991 dollars was $2.2 trillion dollars. Estimate converted to 2008 dollars using bls.gov
inﬂation calculator.
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the magnitude of the gap.
To summarize, 16 percent of public investment maintains US water-infrastructure
that valued as an asset is worth $485.6 billion dollars, the asset is about to reach
the end of its economic usefulness, and population growth is signiﬁcant.2 The combination of these factors creates a water-infrastructure investment gap of enormous
proportion. Assuming Pereira’s estimate remains constant implies that projected
needs are as much as four times greater than the existing infrastructure asset value.
While the extant economic literature addresses the value of public-infrastructure
and looks at the share of water-infrastructure to the total, there has been little
research addressing this multi-billion dollar shortfall. Technical reports estimate the
size of water-infrastructure needs across the U.S. and Cummings and Schulze (1978)
modeled optimal investment for social-infrastructure in boomtowns; however, the
literature does not yet address the water-infrastructure investment decision. This
research begins to ﬁll that gap by developing a theoretic model for replacement.
I model optimal water-infrastructure investment as a function of existing capital
infrastructure and the size of the customer base.
The model is a function of utility costs, the price of water, the customer base,
and the capital stock. The theoretical model suggests that the utility needs to compare the marginal net beneﬁts (MNB) of continued maintenance to the MNB of replacement. This comparison is conceptually consistent with Nessie Curve Analysis, a
method currently used by many water utilities to forecast infrastructure replacement
needs (Cromwell et al., 2001). The empirical estimates of the population elasticity
and the capital stock elasticity suggest that the size of the existing capital stock and
the utility’s customer base inﬂuences that fundamental economic decision. I ﬁnd
that the water utility may reduce investment need through use of appropriate policy
2 The

U.S. Census Bureau estimates that through 2020, population growth in the
Southern United States to be 43 percent while in the Western U.S. to be 46 percent;
www.census.gov last accessed 18 April 2009.
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tools.
The paper proceeds with theoretical model development in Section 2.2. Theoretical solutions are econometrically tested and discussed in Section 2.3. I use the model
and empirical results to consider implications for utilities under various conditions
in Section 2.4. The model results oﬀer some conclusions and implications for future
work that are discussed in Section 2.5.

2.2

Optimal Infrastructure Investment

The term water-infrastructure covers many components. Distribution systems, water
reservoirs, transmission mains, treatment facilities, pumping stations, groundwater
wells, and others collectively compose water infrastructure. Water system needs encompass all of these speciﬁc infrastructure types. My purpose is to model a general
path of infrastructure investment the water utility may follow to address infrastructure needs. Thus infrastructure is a general reference in this paper.
Infrastructure quantity and quality determine the ﬁrm’s capacity, this implies
that the ﬁrm may consider infrastructure needs in capacity terms. Capacity needs
increase with the customer base and decrease with non-usable infrastructure. The
utility’s water-infrastructure is really the capital used to treat and distribute water.
Thus, a capacity adjustment – adjustment cost model facilitates the ﬁrm’s capacity
adjustment and capital accumulation problem (Caputo, 2005, p. 460).
Capital accumulation models were ﬁrst used by Gould (1968) who set forth the
basic idea to optimally choose capital accumulation at the level of the ﬁrm. Prior to
Gould, capital accumulation was primarily dealt with in the macroeconomics literature in the tradition of neoclassical growth (Atsumi, 1965; Cass, 1965). More recently,
adjustment cost models have been used in the context of natural resources (Rubio,
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1992) and water, where Carey and Zilberman (2002) speciﬁcally investigate the eﬀect
of uncertainty on capital accumulation. This paper contributes to the research on
capital accumulation and social infrastructure investment with a direct application
to optimal water-infrastructure investment in the water-resources literature.

2.2.1

The Utility’s Decision

Consider a publicly owned cost-minimizing water utility. Let the utility be a price
taker meaning that a regulatory authority or policy maker and not the ﬁrm sets the
water price p. Water production Q(t) at any point in time is a function of existing
capital, K(t), labor L(t), and capital infrastructure investment, M (t). The utility’s
production function is:
Q(t) = F [K(t), M (t), L(t)].

(2.1)

Under the objective of cost minimization, the problem for the ﬁrm is to choose
an optimal level of investment M ∗ (t). The ﬁrm needs M (t) to replace worn out
existing capital and expand capital to meet the demand of a growing customer base.
Consistent with economic theory, FK > 0, FKK ≤ 0, FL > 0, FLL ≤ 0. The theory of
the adjustment cost model says that FM ≤ 0, and FM M ≤ 0. This critical assumption
means that instantaneous investment does not produce instantaneous output. For
example, a water main built in the current time period does not contribute to water
output in the same period.
I model the population eﬀect through the utility’s production decision as it enters
capital and investment in per capita terms. Assume homogeneity of degree one in
the production function. Let
F [μK(t), μM (t), μL(t)] = μ[K(t), M (t), L(t)] ∀ μ > 0.
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M (t)
K(t)
, and m(t) =
. Substituting this
L(t)
L(t)
into equation (2.2) and assuming that the production function is multiplicatively

Given, L(t) > 0, let μ = L(t)−1 , k(t) =

separable in labor yields
f (k(t), m(t), 1) = L(t)−1 F [K(t), M (t), L(t)],

(2.3)

so that
F [K(t), M (t), L(t)] = L(t)f (k(t), m(t), 1).

(2.4)

The right-hand-side (“rhs”) of equation (2.4) is the population-weighted production
function in per capita terms.
Investment, M (t), in any period impacts the utility’s capital stock, K(t), as does
the rate of depreciation, δ, of existing capital. That is,
K̇ = M (t) − δK(t),

(2.5)

where δ is the rate of physical depreciation on the capital stock (Burness and Patrick,
1992). Dividing equation (2.5) by L(t) yields
K̇(t)
= m(t) − δk(t).
L(t)

(2.6)

Note that the rhs of equation (2.6) captures the population eﬀect while the left-handside (“lhs”) does not. Further, note that the population-weighted level of capital is
K(t) = k(t)L(t). Diﬀerentiating this with respect to time and rearranging yields,
K̇(t)
= k̇(t) + ηk(t),
L(t)
where η =

(2.7)

L̇(t)
. Equating equations (2.6) and (2.7) with rearrangement yields:
L(t)

k̇(t) = m(t) − (δ + η)k(t).

(2.8)
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Incorporating the population eﬀect suggests that the change in the per capita
capital stock [k̇(t)] is equal to per capita investment [m(t)] less depreciated capital. The augmented depreciation term (δ + η) captures the fact that while capital
depreciates at the rate δ, the population growth rate η also contributes. Thus the
population eﬀect, through augmented depreciation (δ+η), increases the rate at which
the capital stock wears out. The population eﬀect captures the fact that more users
in the system increases the rate at which infrastructure wears out. Essentially population growth adds to the rate at which capital stock quantity or quality declines.
In steady state, per capita investment m(t) equals the augmented depreciation of
capital (δ + η)k(t).
The water utility is restricted in what it can optimally choose. For example,
population size and the population growth rate are exogenous to the infrastructure
investment decision. It can, however, choose an optimal level of capital investment.
Therefore the objective for the publicly owned water utility is to optimally manage
infrastructure assets, minimize costs, and choose the optimal level of per capita
investment, m(t). I model the duality to cost minimization; a ﬁrm that minimizes
costs given appropriate constraints maximizes proﬁts.
Investment is not costless and comes at a price of g dollars per-unit of capital
investment. By choosing investment, the utility replaces failed infrastructure and
expands capacity to accommodate a growing customer base. The utility charges
the policy regulated water price p dollars per water unit. The parameters g and
p constitute the policy eﬀect since the regulator can charge g to new customers
connecting to the system and p to current water users. Repair costs to maintain
existing capacity are c dollars per capacity unit. The utility anticipates that the
labor force growth follows the logistic equation L(t) = L(0)eηt where η is labor force
growth rate which is, by assumption, the same as the population grows rate. The
utility internally discounts proﬁts at the rate ρ to bring beneﬁts and costs of the
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investment decision into present value dollars.
Formally the utility’s objective is:
 T
max V =
e−ρt L(0)eηt [pf (k(t), m(t), 1) − ck(t) − gm(t)] dt.
m(t)

(2.9)

0

Setting the constant L(0) = 1, the objective becomes
 T
max V =
ert [pf (k(t), m(t), 1) − ck(t) − gm(t)] dt,
m(t)

(2.10)

0

where r = η − ρ and r < 0 for ρ > η, and constraints are:
k̇(t) = m(t) − (η + δ) k(t)
k(0) = k0 , k ≤ k(t) ≤ k
λ(T ) = 0,

k(T ) = kT ,

(2.11)

T ﬁxed

which means that the utility would follow the investment path given as the solution
to this problem over the planning horizon T . The utility’s problem is to choose m(t)
(control variable) to maximize utility proﬁts under the constraint of k(t) (state variable) through time and by restrictions on capital given by the boundary conditions.
The per capita level of capital must be maintained at a level contained in the interval
(k, k).
The current value Hamiltonian is:
H = pf (k(t), m(t), 1) − ck(t) − gm(t) + λ(t) [m(t) − (η + δ)k(t)] ,

(2.12)

where λ(t) = ert σ(t), is the option value of capital investment. The ﬁrst order
necessary conditions are:3
∂H
= 0 ⇔ pfm − g + λ = 0
∂m
−

(2.13)

∂H
= λ̇ − rλ ⇔ λ̇ = −pfk + c + λ(δ + 2η − ρ)
∂k

3 Note

(2.14)

that from here on time arguments will be dropped for ease of mathematical
expression.
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∂H
= k̇ ⇔ k̇ = m − (η + δ)k
∂λ

(2.15)

with the transversality condition,
lim ert H(k, m, λ) = 0.

(2.16)

t→T

Closed form solution to this problem requires additional functional restrictions.
Notwithstanding, some qualitative insights are possible at this level of generality.
Application of the maximum principle produces equation (2.13). Consider ﬁrst
the interpretation of pfm , the marginal revenue product of investment. Recall that
the adjustment cost model assumes fm ≤ 0. This implies that investment is costly
to the utility in terms of foregone production. Resources allocated to investment
in current periods are resources that are not part of proﬁts since instantaneous investment does not produce instantaneous revenue. Thus, pfm is foregone marginal
revenue from investment or in other words, it is an opportunity cost of investment.
Resources invested in capital are resources not available for other purposes. This
underscores the management reality that the utility’s investment decision implies
tradeoﬀs. The utility must answer the question, what is the best use of resources?
Is it infrastructure investment or alternative investments?
The eﬃcient answer to that question is aided by the costate variable λ, which
is the marginal value of investment. Investment is costly yet the utility invests to
replace and expand capital as is economically eﬃcient. Expansion and replacement
increase the level of asset quantity and quality with which the utility delivers water
service to customers currently and in future periods. Thus, λ is an option value since
it is the marginal increase in the utility’s proﬁt function from an increase in the per
capita stock.
For the utility to eﬃciently choose investment it must choose an optimal per
capita level m∗ such that the marginal beneﬁts of investing in the system are equal
to the marginal costs of investing. The marginal costs are the per-unit cost g, plus
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the opportunity cost of investment pfm . Optimally the utility should invest to the
point where, rearranging from equation (2.13), the marginal investment beneﬁt is
equal to the marginal investment cost,
λ = g − pfm .

(2.17)

To determine whether or not the transversality condition in equation (2.16) is
satisﬁed, consider equation (2.14). At the terminal time T the condition pfk = c
must hold. This says that the marginal revenue product of existing capital is equal
to the cost of maintenance. Further, let (k ∗ , m∗ ) be the solution to the utility’s
maximization problem. Assuming m∗ > 0, and that λ(T ) = 0 so that no value of
investment remains beyond the planning horizon, equation (2.17) says that at the
end of the planning horizon, the value of the marginal revenue product of investment
is equal to the per unit marginal cost of investment. From equation (2.12), total
revenue is equal to total cost. Allowing the utility to earn normal economic proﬁts is
analogous to cost minimization and is thus a welfare maximizing solution. Therefore,
the transversality condition is satisﬁed.
The utility needs the path of investment that minimizes utility costs over time.
The optimal investment path is found by taking the time derivative of equation (2.17)
to get:




λ̇ = −p fmm ṁ + fmk k̇ .

(2.18)

Substituting equation (2.17) into equation (2.14) and equating equations (2.14) and
(2.18), with rearrangement, solves for the optimal path of investment.
ṁ = −


1 
−pfk + c + (−pfm + g)(δ + 2η − ρ) + pfmk k̇ .
pfmm

(2.19)

To model the impact of the capital stock on investment, substitute equation
(2.15) into equation (2.19) to ﬁnd the reduced form of the optimal time path for
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investment,
ṁ =

[pfk − c] + [(δ + 2η − ρ)(pfm − g)] − [pfmk (m − (η + δ)k)]
.
pfmm

(2.20)

Combining this with the change in capital stock yields a system of diﬀerential equations that can be used to solve the utility’s dynamic optimal investment decision:
k̇ = m − (η + δ)k.

(2.21)

The utility’s investment decision is a dynamic decision based on the population
eﬀect, the capital stock eﬀect, and the policy eﬀect. Positive or negative investment
is determined by the interaction of the MNB of repairs, the MNB of replacement,
and the capital stock eﬀect.

2.2.2

Interpreting the Investment Decision

From equation (2.20), let [pfk − c] = A. This is the MNB of repair to existing
infrastructure. Recall that [pfk − c] ≥ 0 since a prudently managed utility would not
spend money on repairs if the cost of doing so exceeds the beneﬁts. Thus A dampens
the path of optimal investment since pfmm < 0.
Let [(δ + 2η − ρ)(pfm − g)] = B. From equation (2.17) we know that (pfm − g)
is the marginal cost of investment. On the optimal investment path marginal cost is
equal to the marginal beneﬁt of investment, λ. The term (δ + 2η − ρ) is the sum of
augmented depreciation and the discount rate. Since pfmm < 0, B is positive when
(δ + 2η − ρ) < 0 and negative otherwise. Thus, determining the sign of the MNB of
investment is an empirical question.
Let [pfmk (m − (η + δ)k)] = C. This is the capital stock eﬀect modeled through
changes in k̇. The value of the marginal revenue product of investment with respect

21

Chapter 2. Optimal Water-Utility Infrastructure Investment

Table 2.1: Summary of Impacts on Optimal Investment ṁ

k̇ < 0

k̇ > 0

k̇ = 0

ṁ < 0

A > (B+C)

(A+C) > B

A>B

ṁ = 0

A = (B+C)

(A+C) = B

A=B

ṁ > 0

A < (B+C)

(A+C) < B

A<B

to capital [pfmk ] is negative, so the capital stock eﬀect is inversely related to optimal
investment.
A summary of possible cases for ṁ is given in Table 2.1. The sign of C is the opposite sign of k̇; thus, optimal investment is considered under the three possibilities.
For ṁ to be positive (negative), m must be greater (less) than the rate at which the
capital stock wears out.
The second column of Table 2.1 shows that if the change in the capital stock
is negative, optimal investment is determined by the magnitude of the MNB from
repairs. If the MNB from repairs exceeds the joint impact of the marginal value of
investment and changes in the capital stock, less should be invested in new capital;
the utility should focus on repairs. Under the case where the change in capital
stock is positive, column three, the marginal value of investment dominates. If the
magnitude of joint impact of repairs and changes in the capital stock are less than the
magnitude of the marginal value of investment, the utility should increase investment.
The reverse is also true. The steady state is shown as the second row of the table.
It occurs when the MNB of repairs is just equal to the MNB of investment.
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The qualitative comparisons of Table 2.1 may seem obvious leaving the reader
to question why develop a model that predicts such a natural economic result? The
answer is that the model uncovers and identiﬁes factors that impact the utility’s
optimal investment decision. At a time when water utilities are faced with the
predicament of failing infrastructure (ASCE, 2009), this model illustrates factors for
the utility to consider which may lead to a path of optimal investment. Now we turn
to empirical testing of the model’s applicability using data provided by the American
Water Works Association (AWWA).

2.3

Testing the Theory

Recall that given the general characterization of the utility’s problem, a closed form
solution to the necessary conditions is not possible. However, I established the
qualitative features of the model based on the diﬀerential system of equations (2.20)
and (2.21). To operationalize and test the applicability of the model I econometrically
estimate the diﬀerential equation system that characterizes the utilitys investment
decision. Testing the applicability of the three eﬀect provides utilities another way
to address investment in asset planning.

2.3.1

The Econometric Model

Econometric estimation of the diﬀerential system requires a conversion of the system
of diﬀerential equations in continuous time to a system of diﬀerence equations in
discrete time. Water systems are indexed by i and survey years are indexed by t
where t is 2006 and t − 1 is 2004. The Appendix provides the derivation that links
the model and the econometric equations. Econometric Model 1 to be estimated
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Table 2.2: Econometric Coeﬃcients and Theoretical Interpretation from Theory Model

From model
ṁ

k̇

with errors

1

and

2

Δmi = β0 + β1

Coeﬃcient Data Variable

Theory
fk + (δ + 2η − ρ)fm
fmm

β0

constant

β1

cit
pit

β2

git
pit

β3

Δk

α0

constant

0

α1

mit

1

α2

kit

−(δ + η)

−
−

1
fmm

(δ + 2η − ρ)
fmm
−

fmk
fmm

is:
cit
git
+ β2 + β3 Δki + γzij +
pit
pit

Δki = α0 + α1 mit + α2 kit + γzij +

1

2.

(2.22)
(2.23)

Table 2.2 shows the connection between the econometric coeﬃcients and theory
via the data variables. The data variables of the model, then, are the cost-price ratio
git
cit
and to investment , per capita investment mit , capacity
with respect to repairs
pit
pit
kit , changes in investment Δmi , and capacity Δki . The variable z is a vector of j
speciﬁc characteristics of system i that controls for heterogeneity in terms of system
size, location, water source, and ﬁnancial position. Signs on the coeﬃcients can be
used to test for consistency with the theory model based on theory parameters in
column four of Table 2.2. The population eﬀect comes through α1 , α2 , and β3 , the
capital eﬀect through β3 , and the policy eﬀect through β2 .
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The theoretical model is constructed at the level of the water service-providing
utility. The data is a survey of many utilities, both water and wastewater, domestic
and international discussed in Section 2.3.3. The ﬁrst eﬀort to control for heterogeneity, z, among utilities represented in the survey is to extract data for water
systems in the U.S. The second eﬀort is to control for system speciﬁc characteristics
in the estimated model. Variables used to control for system speciﬁc characteristics
are water source, system size, region of the U.S. where the system is located, and a
ratio of total liabilities to total assets which compose z.
The data used to construct the variable cit are operating costs divided by capacity.
The result is a variable in units of dollar costs per gallon capacity representing the
cost of maintaining existing capacity. I convert expansion fees to the variable git .
The sum of expansion fees multiplied by accounts and divided by capacity gives
git whose units are dollars per gallon capacity. This variable represents the cost of
expansion in per capacity terms. I calculate the average price of a gallon of water,
pit , as the average revenue: operating revenue divided by water sales.4
The stock and control variables (kit and mit ) are by deﬁnition per capita capacity.5
Data used to construct kit are capacity divided by population. The units of kit are
gallons of capacity per person. I convert the ﬁve-year capital needs forecast in each
survey year using a two-period moving average. Capital needs are converted to units
of mit (gallons of capacity per person) by dividing capital needs per person by git
(dollars per gallon). The model speciﬁes a diﬀerential system of optimal investment
yet the data describes investment need. I assume that investment need given in the
4 The

model was estimated using the average price of water and the average price (rental
price) of capacity: total operating revenue divided by capacity. The model performed better
using the price of water.
5 An alternative speciﬁcation of the model is in terms of dollars per person (asset value
per person). The model of (2.22) and (2.23) was estimated in two speciﬁcations: in terms
of dollars per person and capacity per person. Capacity per person performed better in all
estimations so is the one presented here.
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Table 2.3: Variables and Deﬁnitions

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

438

0.6675

0.1973

438

3.9986

5.5829

488
377
496

329.6
200.73
1.1956

212.72
859.91
1.0051

Gallons of existing capacity per capita
Gallons of needed capacity per capita
Firm region = west then 0; south then
1; midwest then 2; northeast then 3

source

496

0.3145

0.4648

Groundwater primary source then 1, 0
othwerwise

size

496

1.7742

0.6207

Population served < 3,300 then 1; >
50,000 then 2; 0 otherwise

debtratio

432

0.3671

0.2295

Ratio of total debts to total assets

c
p
g
p
k
m
region

Deﬁnition
Ratio of maintenance cost to water
price
Ratio of expansion cost to water price

data proxies well for optimal investment at the utility level.
The descriptive statistics of the empirical model variables are shown in Table 2.3.
Observations were lost due to some missing data. I imputed missing observations
and ran the model but results were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the model where
missing observations were dropped. To avoid any error introduced by imputation
I did not use any imputed data. Rows two and three in the table are ratios. Pergallon costs to maintain existing capacity are roughly 67 percent of the per-gallon
water price. Per-gallon costs to expand capacity are roughly 400 percent greater
than the water price. The mean level of capital stock, k, is 330 capacity gallons
per person while the mean level of capital investment needs, m, is 200 capacity
gallons per person. The z vector variables are relatively self-explanatory. source
describes systems water supply; roughly 30 percent of the systems rely primarily
on groundwater. The system service population of utilities represented in the data
ranges between 3,300 and 50,000 people hence the data reﬂects primarily medium to
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large systems that are in a relatively good equity position based on debtratio.6

2.3.2

Estimating the Model

The empirical model can be estimated under two speciﬁcations: as a diﬀerence model
and as an autoregressive model. Model 1 is the diﬀerence model in equations (2.22)
and (2.23). Model 2 is the following lagged model:
mit = β4 + β5

cit
git
+ β6 + β7 kit + β8 kit−1 + β9 mit−1 + γzij + ω1
pit
pit

kit = α3 + α4 mit + α5 kit−1 + γzij + ω2 .

(2.24)
(2.25)

I use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on each equation in Model 1.
Testing reveals that heteroskedasticity and endogeneity are not a problem for either
equation. I test for endogeneity by running an OLS regression on each equation in
Model 1 followed by a two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS) regression where
equations are estimated simultaneously. Hausman’s speciﬁcation test of 0.11, distributed as chi-squared χ2 with seven degrees of freedom, ﬁnds there not to be a
systematic diﬀerence between OLS and 2SLS estimators. A test for heteroskedasticity post estimation fails to reject the null of constant variance with a Breusch-Pagan
test statistic of 0.25, χ2 with one degree of freedom. However, Model 1 does not
explain very much of the variation in the data.
Model 2 estimation results show that this is a better ﬁt of the data than Model 1.
I run an OLS regression on each equation and ﬁnd that more variables are statistically
signiﬁcant and the R2 shows that Model 2 explains more of the variation. Further, we
run a 2SLS on the simultaneous system of equations. Hausman’s speciﬁcation test
estimate 0.03, χ2 with seven degrees of freedom ﬁnds endogeneity not to be a problem.
6 Medium

to large systems deﬁned by the EPA are those serving populations of size
3,300 to 100,000 (EPA, 2002a).
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However, under the null of constant variance the Breusch-Pagan test statistic 1561.83,
χ2 with one degree of freedom, ﬁnds that the variance is not constant. To correct
the non-constant variance, we re-specify Model 2 by taking the natural log of model
variables. Model 3 becomes:
ln mit = β̃4 + β̃5 ln

cit
git
+ β̃6 ln + β̃7 ln kit + β̃8 ln kit−1 + β̃9 ln mit−1 + γ̃zij + ω̃1 (2.26)
pit
pit

ln kit = α̃3 + α̃4 ln mit + α̃5 ln kit−1 + γ̃zij + ω̃2 .

(2.27)

Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the results of regressions for Model 1 and Model 3. The
natural log speciﬁcation of Model 3 corrects for non-constant variance by minimizing the variation. However, when I check for endogeneity by running OLS and 2SLS
then comparing the estimates using Hausman’s test, I ﬁnd that there is a problem.
cit git
, source, size,
I instrumentize k with the exogenous variables in the model ( ,
pit pit
region, and debtratio) then run the estimation as 2SLS. The Hausman speciﬁcation
test 19.6, χ2 with nine degrees of freedom, rejects the null of no systematic diﬀerence
between OLS and 2SLS estimators hence 2SLS is the correctly speciﬁed model. In
instrumenting the model, ln k the cost price ratio with respect to investment is a statistically signiﬁcant estimator for per capita capacity while the cost price ratio with
respect to maintenance is not statistically signiﬁcant. The Pagan-Hall test for heteroskedasticity on 2SLS models ﬁnds that the variance is constant. The test statistic
5.4, χ2 with nine degrees of freedom, fails to reject the null that the disturbance
is homoskedastic. Thus, Model 3 is the correct speciﬁcation and explains more of
the variation than Model 1. The correct econometric speciﬁcation is a system of
simultaneous equations.
Empirical testing ﬁnds that Model 3 explains a third of the variation in the data
and is a better speciﬁcation. Prior to taking logs, the coeﬃcients could provide
insights to the magnitude of parameters estimated. The elasticity interpretation
that comes with logs means that the signs and signiﬁcance of variables remains the
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Table 2.4: Econometric Results for Model 1

Variable
constant
cit
pit
git
pit
Δki

m Regression
Coeﬃcient Estimate s.e.
β0
-45.696
680.781
β1

925.191

575.606

β2

-22.060

18.575

β3

0.004

1.112

k Regression
Coeﬃcient Estimate s.e.
α0
-6.814
40.865

mit

α1

-0.003

0.007

kit

α2

0.104∗

0.041

region

γ1

112.282

98.926

γ1

6.660

8.560

source

γ2

47.778

205.750

γ2

41.783∗

16.877

debtratio

γ3

-955.578

500.761

γ3

-31.497

39.606

size

γ4

-147.926

189.744

γ4

-17.178

13.934

R2
0.10
2
adj. R
0.04
114
N
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.00

0.15
0.11
125

same except that estimate are now interpreted as percentage changes rather than
level changes. Table 2.6 provides six tests that determine the applicability of the
model, given the data.
Consider equation (2.26), the m equation in Model 3. From Table 2.5 the signiﬁcant variables are the constant, two forms of k, and the investment cost-price
ratio. Using these results in conjunction with the relationship between econometric
coeﬃcients and theory predictions identiﬁed in Table 2.2 I can construct a set of
qualitative tests to check for consistency between the theory and empirical models.
Table 2.6 shows three consistency tests for equation (2.26).
After model speciﬁcations, the sign of β2 in Table 2.2 is equal to the sign for β̃6 .
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Table 2.5: Econometric Results for Model 3

m Regression
Coeﬃcient Estimate s.e.

Variable

k Regression
Coeﬃcient Estimate s.e.

constant
cit
ln
pit
git
ln
pit
ln kit

β̃4

-4.316∗

1.671

α̃3

1.539∗∗∗

0.328

β̃5

-0.069

0.603

α6

0.019

0.131

β̃6

-0.978∗∗∗

0.135

α7

0.164∗∗∗

0.039

β̃7

4.945∗∗∗

0.865

ln kit−1

β̃8

-3.589∗∗∗

0.808

α̃5

0.619∗∗∗

0.061

ln mit−1

β̃9

0.168

0.109
α̃4

0.154∗∗∗

0.034

ln mit
region

γ1

-0.144

0.135

γ1

-0.001

0.031

source

γ2

0.048

0.297

γ2

0.121

0.063

debtratio

γ3

0.488

0.715

γ3

-0.073

0.150

size

γ4

0.408

0.269

γ4

-0.047

0.050

R2
0.30
2
adj. R
0.24
N
108
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.00

0.72
0.70
120

We know that β̃6 = 0 and that the sign is determined by (δ + 2η − ρ) >
0. Test
<
1 presents this comparison with the coeﬃcient estimate. Since β̃6 = -0.978 which,
means that investment with respect to the investment cost-price ratio is somewhat
inelastic, we know that (δ + 2η − ρ) < 0 must be true. Assume a depreciation rate
commensurate with an expected useful infrastructure life of 50 to 80 years. The mean
population growth rate per year from the data is 1.75 percent. The Water Resources
Development Act of 1974 requires federal water projects to use a discount rate based
on the Treasury’s average rate of borrowing (Kohyama, 2006). The average longterm borrowing rate paid by the treasury is 6.2 percent.7 Our model says that the
7 Calculation

based on the average 30 year bond rate from 1990 through 2007. For years

30

Chapter 2. Optimal Water-Utility Infrastructure Investment

average utility’s internal rate of discount is 5.5 percent which ﬁts with discount rate
based on the U.S. Treasury borrowing rate.
Table 2.6: Tests of Model 3 Consistency to Theory Assumptions

Equation Test
(2.26)

(2.27)

Theory

Coeﬃcient

Consistent Interpretation
with Theory

1

β̃6 = 0

β̃6 = -0.978

yes

δ + 2η < ρ∗

2

β̃8 < 0

β̃8 = -3.589

yes

fmk < 0,

3

β̃4 < 0

β̃4 = -4.316

yes

fm < 0, fmm < 0

4

α̃3 = 0

α̃3 = 1.539

no

missing variables

5

α̃4 > 0

α̃4 = 0.154

yes

m impacts k

6

α̃5 < 1

α̃5 = 0.619

yes

physical depreciation

∂ ṁ
∂ k̇

<0

* δ = [0.0125, 0.02], η = 0.0175, ρ ≥ 0.055
Test 2 conﬁrms the model assumption that the change in investment is inversely
related to the change in the capital stock and elastic since β̃8 = -3.589. This means
that the marginal product of investment with respect to changes in capital is negative
and is consistent with the theory. Test 3 allows us to interpret the constant term.
From the empirical results recall that β̃4 < 0 and from Test 1, that ρ > δ + 2η.
From Table 2.2 the denominator of the constant, fmm , is negative which means that
the numerator must be positive. By assumption fk > 0 and by empirical testing
(δ + 2η − ρ) < 0 which means that fm < 0. This result is consistent with the
theory model, it is also the major underlying assumption of the adjustment cost
model. Investment is costly to the utility in terms of foregone production since
instantaneous investment does not produce instantaneous output.
Lagged investment does not play a signiﬁcant role in current investment, β̃9 is
not statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that the capital stock eﬀect plays a more
where the 30 year bond was not available, the 20 year rate was used.
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signiﬁcant role in current investment than historic investment. The cost price ratio
with respect to maintenance is not statistically signiﬁcant. The theoretical model
says that it should be included however in econometric testing, when just the cost
of maintenance cit is regressed rather than the ratio, cit becomes signiﬁcant. Model
2 ﬁnds the cost price ratio is signiﬁcant with the expected sign. Correcting for
heteroskedasticity with the natural log operator makes the maintenance cost-price
ratio insigniﬁcant. This is due to the log operator reducing the small variation (Table
2.3) to an even smaller amount of variation.
Consider now the k equation. Test 5 shows that the impact of per capita investment is signiﬁcant since α̃4 > 0. A one percent increase in last period investment
leads to an increase of 0.15 percent in the capital stock in the current period. Further, Test 6 shows that the capital stock depreciates. For a one percent increase in
the capital stock last period, 0.62 percent remains in the current period. Recall that
the lhs of equation (2.23) is kit − kit−1 . Model 3 has kit as the lhs variable so the
expected sign of kit−1 is positive as it moves to the rhs. The data bears out this
result. While the sign is not negative, the interpretation illustrates the change in
capital stock between periods. Test 4 shows that the model does not include all the
variables that explain changes in the capital stock. This is likely due to aggregation
issues that omit variables. Test 2 and Test 5 conﬁrm that the optimal investment
decision is dynamic and connected to the capital stock.
In terms of water system heterogeneity, system speciﬁc characteristics do not play
a role in explaining investment and capital per person. The z vector is not statistically signiﬁcant in either estimation, nor is it if variables are run as dummies instead
of categorical. This makes sense under the theoretical model since heterogeneity does
not enter. These system speciﬁc variables were included for completeness and their
lack of signiﬁcance validate that the theoretical model developed is a general, not a
system speciﬁc model.
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2.3.3

The Data

I construct a dataset based on the AWWA “Water and Waste Water Rate Survey”
conducted in 2004 and 2006 (AWWA, 2004, 2006). The 2004 survey reports 361 respondents from the U.S. and countries abroad.8 On average, six water or wastewater
utilities per U.S. state responded. The 2006 survey reports 266 respondents from
the U.S. and Canada. On average, ﬁve water or wastewater utilities per U.S. state
responded to the 2004 survey. The survey collects data on rates, services provided,
consumption, system characteristics, ﬁnancial statements, and capital investment
needs. Descriptive statistics for data used to derive our variables are given in Table 2.7. I report for U.S. water systems where data are categorized by system size,
expansion fees, assets and liabilities, and capital needs.
The population and accounts data in the ﬁrst category, System Size, are the sum
of residential and non-residential customers. The daily water treatment production
capacity survey question asks utilities for the sum of permitted production. I recognize that good engineering practices build in excess capacity, for this reason capacity
proxies for the total usable capital stock in the system. Water sales record the volume
sold.
Expansion fee data reﬂects the cost of expanding services. The impact fee covers
the capital recovery cost necessary to ﬁnance trunk facilities. Trunk facilities include
transmission mains, treatment facilities, and source of supply facilities. Assessment
fees cover capital costs of line extensions and to extend facilities to new customers,
generally residential. Connection fees, often called utility expansion charges, recover
the cost of physically connecting new customers to the water system.
8 Countries

represented in the 2004 data include: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
China, Chinese Taiwan, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia,
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.
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Assets and liabilities data delineates costs and revenues by type. I report costs
and revenues of operating the water system. Operating costs are annual water operating expenses before depreciation. From the balance statement, total liabilities
are the sum of current and long-term liabilities and long-term debt. Total assets are
those of the water system. The model does not depend on utility equity so I report
assets and liabilities only although the survey provides system equity data.
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496

total assets
496
496
496
496
496
230

496

total liabilities

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

496

operating revenues

Capital Needs

496

operating costs

Assets & Liabilities

496
496
496

impact
assessment
tap

Obs
496
496
496
496

Expansion Fees

System Size

Data
accounts
population
capacity
water sales

Std. Dev.
108.67
801.76
166.11
42.29

78.71

49.01

12.41
26.12
22.86
25.59
21.65
17.90

37.40
88.37
65.09
105.12
73.26
47.36

354.89 706.99

169.19 453.11

43.54

27.91

712.73 1354.37
349.54 1271.99
593.56 903.47

Mean
78.47
389.33
100.80
18.77

Forecasted capital improvement needs
in millions of dollars

Total operating cost costs in millions of
dollars
Total operating revenue revenue in millions of dollars
Total debt service and liabilities in millions of dollars
Total assets in millions of dollars

Impact fee per new account
Cost to extend service to new account
Price per new account to connect to system

Deﬁnition
Total accounts in thousands
People served in thousands
System capacity in million gallons
Total water sales in billion gallons per year

Table 2.7: Data Descriptive Statics with Summary Deﬁnition
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Capital needs data gathers water systems’ investment need from their capital
improvement plans (CIP). The 2004 survey reported the capital needs forecast from
years 2004 through 2008 while the 2006 survey reported the forecast from 2005
through 2009. By year, then, the capital needs forecast is the dollar amount that
water systems will need for system expansions, upgrades, and replacements. Observations change for the 2009 forecast estimate since it occurs only in the 2006 survey.
I consider the applicability of our model to U.S. water systems in the next section.

2.4

Interpreting Results

The theory of the utility’s optimal investment decision explains roughly a third of
the variation in the data from water utilities across the U.S. The next task is to
consider how the model results may provide water utility managers with an additional
instrument in their capital planning process. To do so, note that water utilities
from around the country face diﬀerent problems related to water infrastructure. For
example, water utilities in the northern and eastern U.S. face the problem of large,
old systems and a shrinking customer base which means revenues are falling. Systems
in the southern and western U.S. face the challenge of meeting water demands of a
rapidly growing customer base while updating aging infrastructure (Cromwell et al.,
2001). These varied concerns suggest that population size and existing capital stock
may inﬂuence U.S. water system investment need, a result found in our model. I
will therefore discuss this further in the following section. In addition, the model
illustrates how policy maker tools (water price and connection costs) may defray
capital needs.
I consider the eﬀects of population, capital stock, and policy maker tools and
then interpret the results in the context of problems facing water utilities.

36

Chapter 2. Optimal Water-Utility Infrastructure Investment

2.4.1

The Eﬀects of Population, Capital Stock, and Policy

Consider Model 3 from Table 2.5. To illustrate how the population size and capital
stock inﬂuence investment need and to show to what extent the policy maker may
need to respond, I use the Model 3 results in per capita terms. This reduced form
is:9
ln

Mit
Kit−1
git
= 13.782 − 2.21 ln
− 0.699 ln
.
Lit
Lit−1
pit

(2.28)

Equation (2.28) shows per capita investment need as a function of lagged per
capita stock and the investment cost-price ratio. Variables are presented as ratios;
however, considering the impact of variables individually allows us to apply Model
3 to infrastructure problems facing water systems. I use the elasticities produced by
the log-log estimation to deﬁne the population eﬀect, the capital stock eﬀect, and
the policy eﬀect.
The lagged population eﬀect suggests that for a one percent increase in population
in the last period, investment need rises 2.21 percent. The capital stock eﬀect has a
lagged, inverse relationship with investment needs. This means that for an increase
in the last period capital stock of one percent, current period investment need falls
by 2.21 percent. The corollary is also true: if the capital stock is reduced due to
infrastructure taken oﬀ line for rehabilitation and replacement need, more investment
is needed and a reduction in population reduces the path of investment.
The population eﬀect and the capital stock eﬀect show the dynamic impact on
the investment decision. The model shows, however, that the policy maker may mitigate the eﬀects of population and deteriorating capital. The policy maker charges
the customer a price g to connect to the system and a price p for dollars per gallon
of water use. The purpose of g is to recover costs imposed on the system by the
9I

use the ln k equation from Model 3 and plug it into ln m and use only the signiﬁcant
variables.
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new customer. The purpose of p is to recover costs of distributing water to the customer. The investment cost-price elasticity (-0.699) suggests that the policy maker
can reduce the utility’s investment need by increasing the connection price, g. This
variable contributes to the discussion of who pays for expansion, existing ratepayers
or new customers? Investment dollars from existing customers comes through p while
investment dollars from new customers comes through g. A ten percent increase in g
holding p constant reduces investment need by seven percent. A ten percent increase
in p holding g constant actually leads to increased investment need. This suggests
that the policy maker can more eﬀectively defray the utility’s investment decision by
placing the expansion burden on new customers, not existing customers.

2.4.2

Implications for Water Systems

I noted earlier the multi-billon dollar investment gap that pervades the 54,000 water
systems in the U.S. The average water system in the dataset (Table 2.7) forecasts
annual capital investment needs at $21 million dollars. This supports the WIN’s
assertion that annual infrastructure shortfalls are as much as $23 billion dollars
(WIN, 2000a). The infrastructure gift given to current water users is about to wear
out leaving current and future users the responsibility of getting water infrastructure
to 21st century standards.
The model provides water system managers another means to address that challenge. Monitoring changes in capacity, population, and policy, and responding accordingly help the utility maintain a path of optimal investment. Water users have
become accustomed to water rate policy that does not generate revenue suﬃcient
for infrastructure replacement. The policy eﬀect suggests that tools readily available
can de facto defray the utility’s investment need by placing the revenue burden on
customers who create the need. Meeting 21st century infrastructure challenges im-
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plies that the historic cost recovery method of revenue generation may need to be
reevaluated. The full cost of replacement and expansion should be reﬂected in policy
instruments.

Cromwell’s Nessie Curve analysis suggests that peak replacement needs are expected in the next 30 years: ten years beyond the time frame of the multi-billion
dollars needs discussed earlier (Cromwell et al., 2001). The cost analysis component of Nessie is similar to our model in that it relies on the fundamental economic
decision of the MNB of replacement relative to the MNB of repairs. Both models
recognize that replacing infrastructure prior to the end of its economic life is costly
yet waiting until infrastructure fails may prove catastrophically costly. A “manage
the crisis” approach is to wait for infrastructure to fail resulting in a management
plan that perpetually has to play catch up and never gets ahead of the problem. The
focus solely on capital in Nessie analysis is analogous to looking at just the capital
stock eﬀect of this model.

In tandem with Nessie, our model shows two contributions that compliment current system forecasts for replacement. The policy eﬀect and the population eﬀect
inﬂuence changes in investment need. Well-managed water systems have CIP that
are updated regularly. The data supports the fact that optimal investment is a
moving target. The eﬀects represented by our model act as guidelines towards an
optimal investment decision. The model suggests that given the dynamic nature of
investment, CIP should be conducted frequently paying close attention to existing
capital, population trends, and prevailing policy instruments. Intricacies in the investment decision imply that the more frequent needs are assessed, the quicker the
policy response can be. The customer base inﬂuences the size of investment need.
In the event of an increase in the customer base, the policy maker can reduce the
impact by changing the investment cost-price ratio.
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2.5

Conclusions and Extensions

The data is consistent with the WIN estimate that annual under-funding estimates
for water utilities are up to $23 billion dollars. The average AWWA water system
forecasts capital infrastructure needs at $21 million dollars. I approach the investment gap crisis that faces U.S. water utilities using an adjustment cost model in per
capita terms to explore a water utilitys capital accumulation and investment decision. The model shows that an optimal investment decision is dynamically aﬀected
by the population eﬀect, the capital stock eﬀect, and the policy eﬀect. The model
suggests that policy maker response may defray the population eﬀect and the capital
stock eﬀect and thus stabilize the utility’s investment decision. Empirical tests of
the model ﬁnd that data supports the theory thus it serves as a guideline for utilities
that wish to mitigate infrastructure funding gaps and invest optimally.
I mentioned earlier that the estimated infrastructure investment gap in the U.S.
is a multi-year, multi-billion dollar problem. Further, roughly 16 percent of public
infrastructure investment is for water infrastructure. Turbulent economic times imply
that the 16 percent slice of the federal budget for water infrastructure may grow
smaller. Water infrastructure is a silent service whose economic turmoil may not
be expressed during the current election cycle. Voter interest in current chaotic
economic issues translates to policy maker agendas that reﬂect the same. Budget
allocations that meet voter interests may in fact reduce public help to meet the
infrastructure crisis. A lack of federal funding, a condition noted by WIN (2000a),
leaves utilities to deal with infrastructure investment gaps from within. Utilities
that recognize the dynamic nature of investment, adjust planning needs based on
the eﬀects we model, and employ appropriate policy instruments may mitigate their
own infrastructure investment gaps and not be part of an infrastructure crisis that
plagues, and is forecasted to continue plaguing, many U.S. water systems.
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The general model of infrastructure investment can be made richer and oﬀer more
insights to optimal investment through a series of extensions. Capital stock and
infrastructure investment were modeled generally. One extension is to disaggregate
infrastructure into speciﬁc types. It may be the case, for example, that utilities have
greater need in pipe rehabilitation than in treatment plant updating. Infrastructure
disaggregation may capture those tradeoﬀs so that the investment decision could
model in which types of infrastructure to invest. Historically, institutional barriers
preclude water systems from charging water prices that cover more than the cost of
distribution. Another extension is to identify the eﬃcient water price in terms of
infrastructure investment and the scarcity value of water.
The results suggest that the individual utility can choose investment based on
population, capital, policy, and growth. Choosing investment optimally helps mitigate funding shortfalls.
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Estimating Impacts of Water
Scarcity Pricing

3.1

Introduction

Water provision is threatened by both increased water scarcity and failing water infrastructure. Water supplies in the Western U.S. are dwindling due to the impact of
a warming climate. In a recent synthesis of extant global warming studies, Saunders
et al. (2008) ﬁnds that temperature increases in the West are greater than any other
part of the country (with the exception of Alaska) due to more frequent and intense
occurrences of drought. For example, on average the Western-coastal states have
experienced a 1.7 degree Fahrenheit increase in the average temperature over the
last 100 years while the mountain and southern states have seen increases of 2.4 and
2.7 degree increases respectively. Of the Western states, the change in Nevada (3.6
degrees) and Colorado (3.1 degrees) are the most drastic. These changes in weather
patterns have a deleterious eﬀect on an already arid region. Contemporaneously,
unprecedented population growth in this region leads to an ever increasing urban
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water demand curve.1 Water provision is also threatened by failing water infrastructure resulting from a chronic underinvestment. Management that depends on
underpriced water for revenue has had to manage the infrastructure resource with
sub-optimal funding; this has led to the current state of disrepair estimated at $23
billion annually to $2.2 trillion over the next 20 years (WIN, 2000a,b).
The economists’ assessment of this water management problem is that prices
are too low, that the true value of water is not reﬂected in demand-side management policy (Hanke, 1978; Martin et al., 1984; Brookshire et al., 2002). Studies
that consider under-priced water include, for example, Moncur (1989) who considered implementing drought surcharges and Collinge (1994) who investigated equity
coupons for promoting water conservation. Others have explicitly considered water
rate structures (Griﬃn, 2001; Olmstead et al., 2007). Another line of inquiry is to
consider non-price, demand-side management as in Renwick and Archibald (1998)
and Renwick and Green (2000). Martin et al. (1984) started the scarcity value investigation when they estimated a Tucson scarcity value of 58 percent more than
existing water prices (p. 57). Others have found the scarcity value to range from
$1.04 to $2.39 per 1,000 gallons in Honolulu and Chicago, (Moncur and Pollock, 1988;
Ipe and Bhagwat, 2002) respectivley.2 Using a sample from California, Jenkins et al.
(2003) estimate that by the year 2020 $1.6 billion will be lost in foregone value from
underpriced water.
Historically, however, there are regulatory barriers that prevent a water manager
from collecting the scarcity value (Young, 1986). Barriers to scarcity pricing range
from cultural beliefs that water is a basic need of human life and should not be priced
as a commodity at market rates (Jordan, 1999; Martin et al., 1984) to concerns for
1 The

U.S. Census Bureau estimates that between 2000 and 2030, population growth
in the Southern United States will reach 43 percent and in the West 46 percent at www.
census.gov last accessed 18 April 2009.
2 Original estimates ($0.58 and $1.58) converted to 2009 dollars using the Bureau of
Labor Statistics inﬂation calculator at www.bls.gov last accessed 18 April 2009.
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equity and the budget constraints of low income users (Griﬃn, 2001). Martin et al.
(1984) note that many cultural belief structures hold that pricing water is similar to
pricing air, that a basic life need should not be priced at all.
Concerning failing water infrastructure, Hansen (2009a) summarizes the major
water infrastructure underfunding issues. The underlying condition is that existing
water infrastructure is nearing the end of its economic life. Water utilities are not
yet behind but face the reality that by the year 2030 expenditures on infrastructure
replacement are forecasted at three and a half times greater than current expenditures
(Cromwell et al., 2001). Further, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
estimates underfunding at $485 to $896 billion through the year 2020 but also notes
that utilities can mitigate funding shortfalls with increases in capital spending at the
real rate of growth (EPA, 2002b). The question thus becomes, where will utilities
generate funds to increase capital spending? This paper oﬀers a potential solution
through optimal water pricing.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First I evaluate the extent to which management of urban, groundwater pumping promotes sustainable use of the aquifer
thus preventing premature exhaustion of the resource. Optimal control of pumping
suggests an eﬃcient price path that includes the water scarcity value, which is the
equivalent to marginal user cost. I ﬁnd that for the case study of Albuquerque, New
Mexico a growing metropolis in the desert Southwest, current water prices are approximately 20 percent of the price level that signals scarcity. A second contribution
of this paper deals with scarcity pricing as an infrastructure investment mechanism.
Utilities need increased revenue for water infrastructure investment. I dynamically
simulate the extent to which collecting the water scarcity value can defray utility
investment shortfalls by considering simulated proﬁts. The results suggest that the
policy maker may get “two birds with one stone” in a single policy prescription.
Eﬃcient water allocation and revenue generation for investment projects may simul-
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taneously be accomplished by water pricing that reﬂects the marginal user cost.
I develop the model of optimal groundwater pumping in Section 3.2 and with
dynamic simulation evaluate the “two-for-one” hypothesis in Section 3.3. The simulation results have implications for existing urban water policy discussed in Section
3.4. Conclusions and extensions are in Section 3.5.

3.2

Theory

Consider the water manager whose task is to manage the groundwater resource that
supplies water to a community. Let the stock of available water (state variable) be
measured by the height of the water table h(t) above a reference point, feet above
sea-leavel in this framework. The manager draws from the aquifer w(t) (control
variable) water units per time period t (acre-feet per year) to meet the water needs
of the population n(t).

3.2.1

Social Welfare

The social welfare function is the diﬀerence between social beneﬁts and costs, or
net beneﬁts. The social beneﬁt to the population depends on the manager’s water
management strategy for groundwater pumping represented by w(t) and the size of
the population n(t). Social beneﬁts are B [w(t), n(t)], ∀ t = 1, ..., T. I model social
beneﬁts using the inverse form of urban water demand as the integrand in:
 w(t)
B [w(t), n(t)] =
p [z, n(t)] dz.

(3.1)

0

where z is the variable of integration. Assume that Bw > 0 and Bww < 0: as the
manager provides more water to the population, beneﬁts increase but at a decreasing rate. Following Capello and Camagni (2000), assume that Bn > 0 and Bnn <
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0. Capello and Camagni challenge the optimal city size hypothesis of the 1960s and
1970s. They suggest optimal city size is a function of many factors, including population where they estimate economies of scale from the population size. However,
they do ﬁnd dis-economies which they call urban overload. Thus, assume diminishing
marginal beneﬁts from increased population.
I model the water manager’s total cost function as:
C [w(t), h(t), n(t)] .

(3.2)

Consistent with economic theory, Cw > 0 and Cww > 0. Following previous work
on groundwater modeling, assume Ch < 0 (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Sloggett and
Mapp, 1984; Brill and Burness, 1994; Knapp et al., 2003) and Chw < 0. The total cost to the water manager is inversely related to aquifer height; as water table
drawdown increases the manager must use more energy to retrieve water supplies.
A higher water table means lower energy needs. Drawing on Griﬃn’s cost function
speciﬁcation, population is modeled as part of the manager’s total cost function since
an increase in population requires the manager to use more resources with which to
deliver water thus Cn > 0 (Griﬃn, 2001). This may include the cost of connecting
the next new customer to the existing water system (e.g., utility expansion costs) or
an increased need for staﬀ and administration.

3.2.2

Groundwater Constraint

The manager’s task is to pump w(t) from a groundwater aquifer to maximize net
beneﬁts. I model available groundwater by the height of the water table, h(t), to
indicate supply. The initial supply is thus measured by h(0) = h0 feet above sea
level and the supply is exhausted when aquifer height reaches a minimum at hmin .
The change in aquifer height is described by the transition equation,
ḣ(t) = f [w(t); Θ],

(3.3)
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where height of the water table changes with pumping, w(t), and Θ, a vector of
hydrologic parameters that impact available water. Assume fw < 0 and that the
>
pumping impact on aquifer height is linear, thus fww = 0. Further, fΘ <
0, which

means that the impact of the hydrologic parameters varies by parameter.

3.2.3

Constrained Welfare Maximization

Assuming the water manager is interested in sustainable water management, and
given an initial height of the aquifer h(0) = h0 , the manager’s problem is to choose
optimal water pumping w(t) over a ﬁxed time horizon, t ∈ [0, T ], where the terminal
time is ﬁxed. The manager’s problem is:
 T
max V =
e−ρt [B (w(t), n(t)) − C (w(t), h(t), n(t))] dt
w(t)

(3.4)

0

subject to:
ḣ(t) = f (w(t); Θ)
h(0) = h0 ,

hmin ≤ h(t) ≤ hmax ,

h(T ) and T ﬁxed

where ρ is the social discount rate.
The present value Hamiltonian to solve the manager’s problem is given by:
H = e−ρt [B (w(t), n(t)) − C (w(t), h(t), n(t))] + λ(t) [f (w(t); Θ)] ,

(3.5)

where λ(t) = μ(t)e−ρt . The conditions necessary for an interior solution include:3
∂H
= 0 ⇔ e−ρt (Bw − Cw ) + λfw = 0
∂w
−

∂H
= λ̇ ⇔ λ̇ = e−ρt Ch
∂h

3 Time

(3.6)
(3.7)

arguments dropped for ease of mathematical presentation.

47

Chapter 3. Estimating Impacts of Water Scarcity Pricing
∂H
= ḣ ⇔ ḣ = [f (w(t); Θ)] ,
∂λ

(3.8)

where (3.6) is the dynamic optimization condition and


lim e−ρt H w, h, n, λ; β = 0

(3.9)

t→T

is the transversality condition where β is the vector of parameters in the optimization.
The manager’s optimal path of groundwater pumping is found by taking the time
derivative of (3.6), substituting in the necessary conditions, and solving for ẇ.4



1
ẇ =
(3.10)
ρ(Bw − Cw ) − ṅ(Bwn − Cwn ) + ḣCwh − λ̇eρt fw
Bww − Cww
The sign of ẇ is determined by marginal net beneﬁts and the rate of change therein,
the eﬀects of population, stock, and opportunity cost.

3.2.4

Interpretation

Consider the interpretation of the necessary conditions. From equation (3.6),
λ=−

[e−ρt (Bw − Cw )]
> 0,
fw

(3.11)

such that λ is the marginal increase in the value of the manager’s objective given an
increase in aquifer height. Further, (Bw − Cw ) ≥ 0 and fw < 0 imply λ > 0.
From equation (3.6) we see an important policy consideration for the water manager. With rearrangement,
P = MC + MUC

(3.12)

where P = Bw , M C = Cw , and M U C = −eρt λfw . Note that Bw is the marginal
beneﬁt of the next water unit, that is it is the per unit price of water. Cw is the
4 Dot

notation indicates the derivative of a variable with respect to time, i.e.
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marginal cost of pumping and λ is the marginal value of a foot of aquifer height. As
aquifer height decreases, λ is the opportunity cost of not having that foot of aquifer
height available for future use. Thus, M U C is the marginal user cost in current value.
The important policy consideration is price equals marginal cost plus marginal user
cost. This means that prices that are set to recover only M C are ineﬃciently low;
customers will consume more water than is eﬃcient if M U C is not part of the price.
Adjoint equation (3.7) suggests that the sign on λ̇ depends on whether aquifer
height is increasing or decreasing since Ch < 0. Once a foot of the aquifer height is
gone, production costs in all future periods increase. This means that the marginal
user cost reﬂects forgone marginal net beneﬁts of all future periods. Thus, from
equation (3.12), MC increases since the aquifer height falls and marginal net beneﬁts
in subsequent periods are less. A foot of aquifer height near the surface is more
valuable to society than at greater depths because deep water is more costly to
produce.
Consider now the optimal pumping program, equation (3.10). The denominator
1
, is the rate at which marginal net beneﬁts
of the ﬁrst term in parentheses,
Bww − Cww
change, which by assumption is negative. Marginal net beneﬁts, ρ(Bw − Cw ), are by
assumption non-negative and are here weighted by the discount rate.
The population eﬀect impacts pumping through ṅ(Bwn − Cwn ). This is the
marginal net beneﬁt of water with respect to changes in the population, which means
that it constitutes the social net beneﬁt of more people using water and impacts optimal pumping. Since the change in population could be positive or negative, the
sign of the population eﬀect is ambiguous.
The resource itself impacts the optimal pumping path through ḣCwh . Aquifer
height impacts pumping through the impact on the cost function. The marginal
change in costs from aquifer changes, multiplied by the change in aquifer height
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impacts the optimal pumping decision. This means that the sign of the stock eﬀect
is ambiguous and varies with changes and direction of changes in aquifer height.
The opportunity cost of foregone aquifer height impacts optimal pumping through
the term λ̇eρt fw . Recall that marginal user cost captures the fact that a foot of aquifer
height used today cannot be used tomorrow. From equation (3.7), recall that the
change in opportunity cost is negative and since fw < 0, the sign of the opportunity
cost impact is positive.
Given the interpretation of the arguments of ẇ, there are many possible combinations for which ẇ is positive, negative, or zero. For example, increasing aquifer
height and decreasing population suggest a diﬀerent optimal pumping case than decreasing aquifer height and increasing population. However, as long as more water
is pumped than recharged, aquifer height decreases. Further, many water utilities
experience growth in the customer base, thus ṅ > 0. This is especially true in the
Southern and Western U.S. where 30-year forecasted population growth rates reach
43 and 46 percent respectively.5
In an eﬀort to understand optimal water pumping in practice, I simulate the
model for conditions in Albuquerque, New Mexico where ḣ < 0 and ṅ > 0. Under
these two conditions, the change in optimal pumping is dependent on the magnitude
of marginal net beneﬁts relative to the the sum of magnitudes of the other arguments
of ẇ. Thus with simulation I determine the sign of ẇ. The manager’s maximization
problem is solved by the system of diﬀerential equations given in (3.3), (3.7), and
(3.10). Recall that equation (3.12) suggests what optimal water pricing, in dollar per
acre foot, should be on the path of optimal groundwater pumping. These equations
become the foundation for the simulation model in the next section.

5 See

note 1.
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3.3

Dynamic Simulations

The purpose of the groundwater model of the previous section is to create a framework to evaluate the extent to which a single policy prescription, controlled groundwater pumping, can mitigate the water manager’s two-fold predicament (scarce water
resources and failing infrastructure). With the framework in place, I now use dynamic simulation to evaluate the impacts of controlled groundwater pumping.
In order to simulate the model, the general framework requires speciﬁc functional
forms discussed here. Recall that the model in the previous section is in general
form and continuous time. The simulation model is in numerical form and discrete
time. I refer to the general model with general notation and speciﬁc notation, model
variables spelled out, for discussing the simulation model. I apply the general model
to a speciﬁc case study of Albuquerque, New Mexico such that results are germane
to this simulation and study area. Data, discussed next, is used to econometrically
estimate water demand and utility costs. Finally, this section provides the initial
values and parameters used in the simulation.

3.3.1

Data

The Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority (ABCWUA), the principal water services provider to the Albuquerque metropolitan area, provided total
revenue and billed water unit data from January 1994 through December 2004 which
constitutes 132 observations. Total revenue is the sum of charges for water units,
sewerage units, conservation surcharge fees, and wasted water fees. Billed water units
are measured in cubic-feet.6 The utility provides water to residential, commercial,
industrial, and institutional customer service types. This means that the data are at
61

unit = 100 ft3 = 748 gallons
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the utility-wide level and reﬂect behavior of all customer types. Thus, the estimated
water price and monthly production reﬂect the use of all customer types.
Aquifer height data is retrieved from the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
data archive website for a monitoring well located near the center of Albuquerque
(USGS).7 From the land surface elevation of 4,980 feet above sea level, depth to water
is measured periodically from year 1957 through 2008. In the period of the ABCWUA
data, January 1994 through December 2004, some aquifer height observations are
missing. I impute the missing observations following the method of multiplicative
decomposition where recorded data from before and after the missing data are used
to estimate missing observations controlling for time trends and seasonal factors
(Bowerman and O’Connell, 1993, p. 324).
Table 3.1: Data Summary Statistics

Data
price

Deﬁnition
Average revenue per unit

Units
Mean
$ per acre foot 2,546

Std. Dev.
1,672

water

Billed monthly water

acre feet

4,250

3,362

cost

Monthly operating cost

$ in thousands

8,580

4,326

account Accounts receiving service

accounts

128,746 42,233

height

feet

4,919.8

Water table height in
feet above sea level

3.37

Table 3.1 shows the descriptive summary statistics for the data. Following the
convention in the literature, I estimate average water price by dividing monthly
total revenue by monthly billed water units and then convert it to acre-feet8 for
the simulation model. ABCWUA did not provide monthly operating cost data.
These are imputed by taking the ratio of yearly total revenue to total operating cost
reported on the utility’s annual ﬁnancial statements (ABCWUA, 2005) and apply
that ratio to the monthly total revenue to produce an estimated monthly total cost.
7 This
81

model does not account Rio Grande surface water diversion in Albuquerque.
acre-foot = 325,851 gallons
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With these data I estimate beneﬁts and costs, or social welfare in the next section.

3.3.2

Beneﬁts and Costs

To simulate the general model requires a functional form for the beneﬁt function
[equation (3.1)] the cost function [equation (3.2)] and the social welfare function
[equation (3.4)]. I econometrically estimate a water demand equation and a longrun total cost equation to recover the partial derivatives and functional forms that
are needed to simulate the model.9 Demand and cost are estimated using the data
described in Table 3.1.
Since it is for use in the simulation model where the model does not implicitly control for seasonal water use, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to
estimate a linear demand function.
watert = 1294 − 0.97 pricet + 0.04 accountt
(719)

(0.12)

(0.005)

(3.13)

(s.e.) N = 132 R̄2 = 0.57
Equation (3.13), in water units acre-feet, is an estimated water demand function
at the utility-wide level for ABCWUA, which reﬂects behavior of all account types.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level
of conﬁdence. The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity fails to reject the null
which is constant variance. The estimated parameter on price indicates that for a
one dollar increase in the average price, monthly quantity demanded falls by 0.97
acre-feet (316,000 gallons) per month. The price elasticity of demand, evaluated at
the mean price and water is -0.58. This suggests that for a ten percent increase
in average water prices utility-wide, water quantity demanded would decrease by
5.8 percent which means this estimated demand is price-inelastic. Brookshire et al.
9 Econometric

c
estimations were done in Stata version 10
.
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(2002) summarize previous water demand studies, of which -0.58 closely ﬁts and is
similar to -0.62 estimated in Gibbs (1978) and -0.61 in Hansen (2009b) where both
studies use average price. The elasticity estimate here is very similar to the mean in
the meta-analysis in Espey et al. (1997) which is -0.51.
Using the estimated parameters of equation (3.13), I populate the social welfare
function [equation (3.1)] with the water demand partial derivatives so that beneﬁts
become:
benef itt = 1324.31 watert − 0.002 watert2 + 0.04 accountt × watert .

(3.14)

Estimated parameters are consistent with theory since, from Section 3.2, Bw > 0,
Bww < 0, and Bn > 0.
The long-run cost equation that I estimate is:
costt = 367.58 watert − 0.07 watert × heightt − 2.1 × 10−4 watert2
(54.52)

(0.01)

(6.1 × 10−5 )

+ 1.06 × 10−8 watert3 + 0.032 accountt .
(3.23 × 10−8 )

(3.15)

(0.004)

(s.e.) N = 132 R̄2 = 0.98
Equation (3.15), in thousands of dollars, is an estimated cost function without a constant term, which makes the interpretation long-run. Standard errors are in parenthesis and the variance is non-constant according to White’s test for homoskedasticity,
which is 34.8. I estimated standard errors using the robust method in STATA so although the model may suﬀer from non-constant variance, it is for use in a simulation
which means the error across simulation scenarios is constant. The estimated cost
equation is consistent with the theory discussed above. Marginal cost, Cw , is positive but decreases with aquifer height. This implies that water drawn from greater
depths is more costly than water near the surface. Further, Cww > 0 for water ≥
4,375 acre-feet which veriﬁes that marginal cost increases with monthly production.
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3.3.3

Hydrology and Population

The theoretical model includes equations for the stock of available water [equation
(3.3)] measured by water table height and a diﬀerential equation for population, ṅ, in
the optimal pumping program [equation (3.10)]. I did not econometrically estimate
these; instead I rely on the literature and calibrated parameters to populate the
equations.
Based on the seminal work in groundwater management by Gisser and Sanchez
(1980), the functional form of the aquifer height transition [equation (3.3)] is modeled
as:
ht+1 − ht =

r + (α − 1) watert
,
Asy

(3.16)

where r is the annual natural water recharge (acre-feet per year) into the water table
and α is the return ﬂow coeﬃcient (unitless) that measures the fraction of watert
that returns to the resource where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Reservoir parameters that aﬀect the
total aquifer volume are A, the acreage overlying the groundwater aquifer assumed
equal to the geographic size of the Albuquerque service area and sy , the speciﬁc yield
coeﬃcient (unitless) that measures the porous space where water exists in the water
table.
I model population growth following the Verhulst logistic equation (Clark, 1990,
p. 11) which, applied to our framework, is:
nt+1 − nt = η nt



nt 
,
1−
K

(3.17)

where η is the population growth rate and K is the carrying capacity. This is used in
the optimal pumping program to identify the number of customer accounts at time
t where I assume three people per account.

55

Chapter 3. Estimating Impacts of Water Scarcity Pricing

3.3.4

Simulation Initialize

Initial values and parameters are set based on empirical data, model calibration, and
estimated initial values. Initial values and parameters used to begin the simulation
are given in Table 3.2.
I estimated η, the population growth rate, and K, the carrying capacity, by
calibrating the model so that simulating equation (3.17) individually replicated Albuquerque population data from the Bureau of Business and Economic Research at
the University of New Mexico (BBER, 2009) for years 1994 to 2004. An annual population growth rate of 1.2 percent and a carrying capacity of 2 million best replicated
the population data. The annual population growth rate used to project growth by
the ABCWUA over the same period is 1.1 (ABCWUA, 2005). For λ0 , I estimate
the initial value based on parameters called for by equations (3.7) and (3.11). The
estimate of $185 million means that a foot of aquifer height that is lost today imposes
a cost on all future users in the form of foregone future marginal net beneﬁts.
Inﬂation, through its impact on price, determines water production and aquifer
height under status quo management. Historically average annual inﬂation has been
three percent and will be applied here.10 The choice of appropriate social discount
rate can quickly become an ethical judgement based on how the manager views future
generations relative to current generations. However, the Water Resources Development Act of 1974 states that in federal beneﬁt-cost analysis, the chosen discount
rate should closely mirror the long term U.S. Treasury rate of borrowing (Kohyama,
2006). I ascertain that four percent reﬂects the Treasury 20-year borrowing rate and
is the best choice for discounting net social beneﬁts.
Annual recharge requires a slightly less objective approach. Scientiﬁc estimates
of recharge vary widely depending on the estimation method and hydrologic assump10 Retrieved

at www.bls.gov last accessed 18 April 2009.
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tions, many of which may change within the given geographic region. McAda and
Barroll (2002) and Archambault (2009) use 30 thousand acre-feet annually yet Kuss
(2005) suggests that recharge can vary from 11 thousand acre-feet to 72 thousand
depending on snow pack levels. The estimate I use falls within the Kuss estimated
range although there may actually be much variation in annual recharge. The fact
that the aquifer height data shows a decrease suggests that pumping has been greater
than recharge.
Figure 3.1: Causal Loop Diagram of Simulation Model

Pumping






Benefits
Costs







Population


Water Table
Height

Social Welfare



Opportunity Cost

c
I ran the simulations with Powersim Studio 7
over a 40-year time horizon with

the simulated month beginning January 2005 on a monthly time step. Figure 3.1
shows the causal loop diagram that depicts the simulation model. Circled positive
and negative signs indicate the impact from one variable to the next and are in
accordance with the theoretical model results.
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Initial study area populationd
Initial number of accounts servede
Total study areaf
Aquifer storativity coeﬃcientg
Annual estimated rechargeh
Return ﬂow coeﬃcienti
Annual population growth ratej
Carrying capacity of study areaj
Annual rate of discountk
Annual inﬂation ratel
Simulation years

Deﬁnition
Initial monthly pumpinga
Initial per-unit water priceb
Initial aquifer heightc
Initial scarcity value

Unit
acre-feet/month
dollars/acre-foot
feet above sea level
$/foot of
aquifer height
people
accounts
acres
unitless
acre-feet/year
unitless
%/year
people
%/year
%/year
years
486,676
161,055
128,000
0.2
54,000
0.059
1.2
2,000,000
4
3
40

Value
5,310
1,564
4915.47
185,059,395

b

From ABCWUA data, December 2004 adjusted for ten percent system loss.
From ABCWUA data, December 2004 average revenue per acre-foot.
c
Aquifer height at USGS site #350824106375301 on 1 September 2004 (USGS).
d
Albuquerque population 2004 (BBER, 2009).
e
From ABCWUA data, December 2004 total accounts.
f
Earp et al. (2006) reported in Albuquerque’s Environmental Story.
g
McAda and Barroll (2002) use 0.2 in their Middle Rio Grande (MRG) simulation.
h
Estimates vary depending on calibration method. We use the average MRG recharge from Kuss (2005).
i
MRGWA (1999) reports this as a seepage parameter for the MRG.
j
I assume these based on calibrating equation (3.17) with Albuquerque data.
k
Based on Water Resources Development Act – 1974 and U.S. Treasury long-term rate (Kohyama, 2006).
l
Average annual inﬂation from 1994 to 2004 at bls.gov last accessed 18 April 2009.

a

n0
account0
A
sy
r
α
η
K
ρ
δ
T

Symbol
w0
p0
h0
λ0

Table 3.2: Simulation Symbols, Deﬁnitions, and Values
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3.4

Results

I compare two scenarios: the optimal pumping program and a pumping program
associated with a pre-determined price path, where prices increase at the rate of
inﬂation. Sensitivity analyses include varying rates of population growth. Optimal
water pumping suggests an optimal water price path that I illustrate. Finally, I
consider impacts to social welfare, the water utility, and customer behavior in the
presence of optimal water pumping and pricing.

3.4.1

Status Quo versus Optimal Control

Status-quo water-pumping management (SQM) represents the case where an urban
water manager pumps water to meet the demand of consumers without considering resource costs. For the manager to cover operating costs and plan for future
investments, a manager in a well-managed water utility charges prices that cover
costs and capital projects. Without considering the impact to costs from an aquifer
height reduction, the manager may believe that costs increase due to inﬂationary
pressure. This means that revenue expectations, and prices, should rise at the rate
of inﬂation.11 I consider SQM a second-best alternative to optimally controlled water pumping (OCM). For SQM, the simulation model uses the initial water price
listed in Table 3.2 and increases water prices at the rate of inﬂation, δ. Water use is
determined by the demand function in equation (3.13).
Equation (3.10) constitutes the optimal water pumping program. This is the
program that maximizes net social beneﬁts subject to the groundwater resource
constraint. The ﬁrst part of the manager’s predicament is increased water scarcity
11 Contra

Costa Water Utility District in the California Bay Area follows a rigid practice
of water rate increases based on the rate of inﬂation to meet operating and future capital
expenditures (Niehus et al., 2008).
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due to diminished groundwater availability and population growth. Thus, I consider
how the aquifer is aﬀected by OCM vis-a-vis SQM. Figure 3.2 shows the simulated
results of the aquifer height which compares OCM to the SQM.
Figure 3.2: Water Table Height Comparison from Optimal Management to Status Quo
Management
SQM

OCM

Aquifer height in feet above sea level

4920
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4880
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2010
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2020 2025 2030
Simulation time

2035
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2045

Figure 3.2 shows that the status-quo aquifer height reaches 4,884 feet above sea
level by 2045. Given the starting value, this is a 40-year aquifer height reduction
of 31 feet. Aquifer height data from 40 years in the past indicates that for the
USGS monitoring well used here, the change in aquifer height is 45 feet.12 This
suggests that SQM has an impact on customer behavior and can reduce the amount
to which the aquifer height declines illustrating the SQM as a second-best alternative.
SQM reduces aquifer height less than actual management. The ﬁgure also shows the
12 Water

table height in some parts of Albuquerque have dropped as much as 160 feet
over the same time interval.
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results of the OCM; the water level decline is not as much as SQM. By 2045, the
aquifer height under the OCM is 4,906 which is a 40-year reduction of 9.8 feet. OCM
preserves 21.6 feet of aquifer height over SQM. For the manager, this means that the
largest extent to which groundwater scarcity can be mitigated is by following OCM.
The simulated recharge rate is still less than monthly water production which means
there will be aquifer mining. However, OCM reduces aquifer height 68 percent less
than the next best management alternative while meeting the water needs of 690,000
people (population in 2045).
The impact on customer behavior is seen through changes in the monthly water
production. Figure 3.3 shows diﬀerences in monthly production from OCM and
SQM. Through simulated year 2020, monthly water production remains relatively
unchanged with SQM. Then, there is a precipitous reduction in monthly production
from year 2020 to 2045. This is due to inﬂation adjusted water price movement
along the demand curve from the price inelastic region to the price elastic region. At
suﬃciently high water prices consumers reduce their use.
The ﬁgure also shows that monthly production steadily increases with OCM but
at a small rate of change. The large ﬂuctuation seen with SQM is not observed
with OCM, which means the growing population makes do with less. In the simulation, equation (3.10) is positive throughout which means that the population eﬀect
dominates the eﬀect of the resource and opportunity cost. That is, the social beneﬁt
function is increasing because new people in the system are using water, which means
that it is optimal for the manager to increase pumping. Notice, however, that the
increase is very small. This means that average water use per person decreases; at
simulation time 2005 average water use is 118 gallons per person per day (GPCD), at
time 2045 under OCM average use is 85 GPCD which is 5,389 acre feet per month.
With SQM, monthly production in 2045 is 5,911 acre feet per month which is 93
GPCD.
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Figure 3.3: Water Production Comparison from Optimal Management to Status Quo
Management
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Sensitivity Analysis

The simulation model is sensitive to at least four parameters, δ, ρ, r, and η of
which I report sensitivity to the population growth rate. Consider how OCM is
impacted from three levels of the population growth rate since it is the parameter
that policy may inﬂuence in how urban development is approached. The base case
represents population growth equal to 1.2 percent from Table 3.2. The “slow” case
represents population growth equal to 0.5 percent and the “fast” case represents
growth at 3 percent. Some regions of the U.S. may experience zero or negative
population growth, e.g. the large northern U.S. cities (Cromwell et al., 2001), while
other regions may experience rates much higher than the one we use, e.g. Nevada
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or Arizona.13 However, the three cases I consider constitute possible optimal water
pumping outcomes on a spectrum of population growth rates. Figures 3.4 and 3.5
show how with OCM, population growth aﬀects the results.
Figure 3.4: Water Table Height for Three Population Growth Rates
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Figure 3.4 shows the water table height, optimally managed, for three cases of
population growth. The terminal height for the base case, slow, and fast is 4906, 4906,
and 4905 respectively. Consider these diﬀerences from the perspective of gallons of
water. Recall that the total area of the study is 128,000 acres and that the speciﬁc
yield is 0.2 (see Table 3.2). This means that in a one-foot slice of the aquifer, there
are 25,600 acre-feet of water. The diﬀerences in water table height thus translate
to 12,442 acre-feet of water between the base and slow growth and 29,133 acrefeet for the diﬀerence between the base and fast growth. This result implies that
an optimally managed water pumping program responds to changes in population
13 See

note 1.
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Figure 3.5: Optimal Production Path for Three Population Growth Rates
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growth. Further, although not shown in the ﬁgure, water table height under the
fast case and SQM is 4,842 feet; this suggests that OCM preserves 64 feet of aquifer
height over the alternative.
The optimal production path is shown in Figure 3.5 for the three population
growth cases. At year 2045, base case monthly water pumping is 5,389 acre feet, for
the slow growth case it is 5,341, and for the fast growth case is 5,528. Analogous to
the impact on water table height, the optimal pumping program adjusts for increasing
population.
I use an elasticity measurement of the impact of the population growth rate on
water production on the optimal path that is:
=

%ΔWater Production
,
%ΔPopulation Growth Rate
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to identify the relationship between OCM pumping and population growth. The
average elasticity for the diﬀerence in the base to slow case and the base to fast
case is 1.4.14 This suggests that on the optimal path, for a one percent increase in
population, monthly production increases by 1.4 percent. This implies that for a
water manager managing urban growth, population growth and increased monthly
water use is not a one-to-one mapping, water use will have to increase at a rate in
excess of the population growth rate.

3.4.3

Scarcity Pricing

In the theory and simulation model, monthly production is the control variable.
That is, the manager pumps the optimal amount from the aquifer to maximize net
social beneﬁts, equation (3.4). Recall from the rearrangement of the optimality
conditions, equation (3.12) is the function that describes the marginal beneﬁt of the
next unit of consumption to society. It is the true value of the next consumption
unit to society since it incorporates the cost of pumping water and the cost of not
having water units available for future use. The manager could charge this optimal,
full-cost price per unit and get the same monthly production amount as controlling
monthly production. In fact, the manager should charge a price similar to equation
(3.12) where price equals marginal cost plus marginal user cost to optimally use the
resource.
Figure 3.6 shows the price path for the two management possibilities, SQM and
OCM, with the two marginal costs that sum to the OCM price path, MC and MUC.
The MUC is the lightly shaded, vertical distance from MC to the the OCM price. In
year 2005, the optimal price is $7,782 per acre-foot and in year 2045 it is is $18,533
per acre-foot. This implies that the MUC in the ﬁrst period is $6,802 per acre-foot
14 For

the base to slow  =

0.9
0.7

and for the base to fast  =
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and in the last period is $16,773 per acre-foot. In current value terms, there is a
steady increase in the MUC which implies that prices under OMC steadily increase.
Figure 3.6: Two Price Paths, SQM and OCM, with Marginal Pumping Cost MC and
Marginal User Cost MUC
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The MUC suggests that for this case study in year 2005, prices with SQM are
approximately 20 percent of the the price level with OCM; by year 2045 SQM prices
are 28 percent of OCM prices. Figure 3.6 shows that although SQM is a second-best
alternative, some MUC is captured; there is some MUC (gray area) below SQM
prices (dashed line).
The optimal price is more than previous estimates of optimal water prices. The
MUC estimated here suggests that existing water prices should be $19 per one thousand gallons more than existing water prices, which is approximately 80 percent
greater than the current level. Moncur and Pollock (1988) found that in Hawaii
the scarcity value was $1.04 per one thousand gallons and Ipe and Bhagwat (2002)
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estimated that in Chicago it was $2.39 per one thousand gallons. I suspect that my
estimate is greater than these since there is increased water scarcity in the test case
than in Hawaii and Chicago. However, the estimate is similar to that of Martin et al.
(1984) who found that Tucson rates should increase by 58 percent to reﬂect scarcity
pricing. Scarcity in Tucson and Albuquerque is more similar than Albuquerque and
Chicago or Hawaii.
The MUC is sensitive to the population growth rate since pumping costs increase with population. Recall that the MUC is the marginal net beneﬁt of the next
consumption unit so that as costs increase, MUC decreases. In the case of slow population growth (see Section 3.4.2) the MUC increases since MC is less. The diﬀerence
in MUC under the base and slow growth case is 0.10 percent. In the fast growth
case, where MC increases and MUC decreases; the diﬀerence is -0.30 percent.
To place the optimal price in context, I compare $7,782 to recorded prices from
water transfers in the Western U.S. Brewer et al. (2007) review water leases and
sales in the 12 western states and consider transfers between agriculture and urban
users. Speciﬁcally I consider the sales data they report since a sale means that the
buyer has in perpetuity the right to use the transfered water. I make this comparison
because in the optimal price, the MUC means that there is a cost placed on society in
perpetuity from not being able to use in the future the acre-foot used today. Further,
the optimal price informs the manager about the price he or she should be willing to
pay to acquire new water resources instead of pumping from the aquifer. In Table 3
of Brewer et al.’s report [p. 24], the mean water sales price for transfers in the West
from 1987 through 2005 is listed. The 2005 price, $8,912 per acre-foot, which can be
considered the price of the next best alternative to groundwater, is slightly greater
than estimated price in this paper. This implies that until the optimal price reaches
$8,912 the manager may be better oﬀ using groundwater than purchasing additional
water rights.
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In 2008 the ABCWUA transfered 2.19 acre-feet from an agricultural user for a
price of $8,000 per acre-foot (Hahn, 2009). The optimal price in the simulation at
the beginning of 2008 is $8,154, which is greater than the price ABCWUA actually
had to pay for the 2008 transfer. This means that the transfer was a good deal for
customers represented by ABCWUA because the acquisition price is less than the
optimal price. Thus, the optimal price path is a schedule of prices that, in addition
to optimally allocating groundwater, acts a reference point to which the ABCWUA
may base the price for new water acquisitions.
Consider now a numerical example of how an individual customer will likely respond to increased water prices. Assume a conservation minded person has installed
a low-ﬂow shower head that ﬂows at 2.5 gallons per minute and that the individual
takes a ten minute shower. Under SQM, p0 from Table 3.2, the individual’s cost of
the the ten minute shower is $0.13. With optimal pricing the conservation-minded
individual would pay, in simulation period one, $0.50 per ten minute shower. A nonconservation minded individual with a high-ﬂow shower (5 gallons per minute) would
experience a price change from $0.26 to $1 for the equivalent ten minute shower.
How would people respond? Assuming the elasticity estimated earlier is representative of the average customer response, -0.58, the conservation and non-conservation
individual would conserve more by limiting their showers to three minutes. The
non-conserving person could install a low-ﬂow shower head then have a six-minute
shower under the new price structure for the same per shower expenditure.
Inherent in this logic is the question of income inequity. Is scarcity value pricing
equitable? How are low and ﬁxed income users aﬀected? Griﬃn (2001) previously
addressed this criticism:
“Water bills should be perceived as what they are: requests for payment
for a valued, delivered service . . . rates do not have a comparative advantage in correcting income inequity and such attempts can be damaging
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to both eﬃciency and conservation objectives.” (p.1336)
From Figure 3.2, recall that OCM reduces aquifer height much less than SQM. Grifﬁn’s statement is true in this context since the OCM aquifer height impact is less
than SQM, water prices less than the OCM level create too much resource use and
are thus ineﬃcient.

3.4.4

Impacts

I noted earlier that the water managers have a two-fold predicament, increasingly
scarce water resources and infrastructure that is near the end of its economic life.
The manager faces this conundrum while trying to do what is best for society, which
I quantify as social welfare. Table 3.3 summarizes these impacts at the end of the
simulation under the status quo and the optimum for the three population growth
cases.
Table 3.3: Simulation Impact Results Summary for SQM and OCM with Three Population Growth Possibilities in Year 2045

Impact

Measurement Units

resource

aquifer
height

SQM

feet above
sea level

OCM
OCM
OCM
Base
Slow
Fast
4,884.1 4,905.7 4,906.1 4,904.6

behavior monthly
pumping

acre-feet

5,911

5,389

5,341

5,528

social
welfare

net beneﬁts

millions
of dollars

9,059

7,834

7,212

9,636

water
utility

proﬁts

millions
of dollars

20

7,820

7,198

9,622

The resource and behavior impacts in the table, consistent with Figures 3.2 and
3.3, show that the optimal pricing program mitigates scarcity by reducing the amount
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of monthly pumping, which in turn minimizes the extent to which the aquifer height
declines. The table shows the fact that customer behavior is modiﬁed since monthly
production is much less, 522 acre-feet, under the optimal program.
The social welfare impact shows a tenuous result. Prima facie the status quo
program is better for society since net beneﬁts are $1.2 billion greater than the
optimal program. The important caveat is that the optimal program maximizes net
beneﬁts subject to the resource constraint yet the status quo does not. Thus, a gain
in social welfare of $1.2 billion comes at a resource cost of 21.6 feet of aquifer height.
The last part of the manager’s predicament is to update water infrastructure.
Optimal water pricing mitigates resource scarcity and generates suﬃcient revenue to
deal with capital funding needs. Table 3.3 shows this by comparing utility proﬁts
under both management programs. The optimal program simulates utility proﬁts at
$7.8 billion while the status quo program estimate is $20 million. This result suggest
that OCM may oﬀer a “two-for-one” solution to the manager’s two-fold predicament.
Recall that Cromwell et al. (2001) suggests that within 30 years, capital expenditures
must increase by a factor of 3.5 to meet infrastructure replacement challenges. The
utility proﬁts result, interpreted qualitatively since it is from a simulation, suggests
that OCM oﬀers the manager a mechanism to generate revenue for infrastructure
replacement.

3.5

Conclusion

This paper uses optimal control theory to create a framework for analyzing the
impacts of collecting the scarcity value of water. I simulate that framework over a
40-year time horizon to identify impacts to the resource, the water utility, and to
society. The model relies on hydrologic parameters, aquifer height, population, water
production, and total water revenues from Albuquerque, New Mexico. I ﬁnd that
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existing water prices are 20 percent of the level where MUC is captured, which is a
$19 per one thousand gallons increase.
The optimal pricing program, which collects scarcity value in the form of the
marginal user cost, preserves at least 21.6 feet of aquifer height when compared
to a status-quo management program. Net social beneﬁt are less under the optimal
program ($7.8 billion) compared to the status quo ($9 billion) because of the resource
constraint; the status quo is not subject to a resource constraint. In the simulation,
the absence of the optimal program ﬁnds that nearly all net beneﬁts accrue to water
customers and the water utility generates signiﬁcantly less revenue than it could
otherwise. This result suggests that, to the extent the simulated utility is similar to
other water utilities, without optimal water pricing utilities may not be able generate
enough revenue to invest in capital improvements projects like water infrastructure
replacement.
Optimal water pricing is not without its critiques. I recognize the need for a
change in regulation to accommodate a pricing program that incorporates the scarcity
value of water. As the institutional modiﬁcation argument develops, this paper
suggests at least three reasons why regulatory barriers should be modiﬁed. Optimal
water pricing preserves aquifer height, generates revenue for capital projects, and
uses price to modify consumer behavior.
The framework uses an unconﬁned, groundwater aquifer model. Recently the
ABCWUA started using surface water diversions to supplement the water supply
through the San Juan Chama Drinking Water Project.15 One extension to this
framework is to build in a surface water component and to make the recharge parameter stochastic. This would add another layer of realism to the model and shed
light on water prices in times of drought. The cost function that I estimate could
15 The

San Juan Chama Drinking Water Diversion Project was completed in December,
2008 at which point the Authority began using surface water to augment water supplies.
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be made richer through well-speciﬁc, pump-speciﬁc estimation. At any one time,
there are between 86 and 109 wells used for the Albuquerque groundwater water
supply. Another extension is to estimate a translog-cost function where each well is
responsible for a share of production as opposed to a single point of reference for the
aquifer height measurement that is used.
I noted in the beginning of the paper that in terms of water resource management,
the economists’ long-sounding battle cry has been higher prices. To that argument
this paper contributes: scarcity value pricing eﬃciently allocates a scarce groundwater resource, oﬀers water managers a means whereby capital improvement projects
may be more easily attainable, and promotes a conservation ethic. The regulatory
problem is that excess revenues are prohibited for the water utility, thus framing
scarcity pricing in the context of infrastructure replacement may be more palatable.
The simulated world that I model can in fact get a “two-for-one” out of a single
policy prescription.
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4.1

Introduction

Water resources are increasingly scarce. Climate change and the increased occurrence of drought, among other things, suggest that an already scarce resource is
becoming more so (Saunders et al., 2008). In tandem, population growth suggests
that residential water demand will continue to increase.1 These two factors alone
suggest that water is increasingly scarce yet there are others that compete for limited supplies. Water users with environmental, recreational, agricultural, cultural,
and other demands have a stake at the water resource decision table. For the urban water manager, one way to deal with scarcity is to promote water conservation
amongst the customer base. This paper investigates the water conservation decision
experimentally.
1 The

Census Bureau forecasts the Western U.S. population to increase 45% over the
years 2000 through 2030. www.census.gov last accessed 18 April 2009
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Water, either from the surface or aquifer, is a common pool resource (CPR), a
speciﬁc public good classiﬁcation. Gardner et al. (1990) list four necessary conditions
that identify a CPR. Condition one, rivalry, states that the ﬂow of resource units are
subtractable, that units consumed by an individual are generally not available for
consumption by another. Condition two, non-excludability, states that two or more
individuals harvest the resource. Conditions three and four state that the individuals’
optimal strategies are not Pareto optimal (Budescu et al., 1995), which means that
increased consumption by one person decreases the well-being of another. Budescu
et al. explain conditions three and four as the CPR dilemma, which is essentially
a conﬂict between collective rationality (“cooperation”) and individual rationality
(“competitive behavior”) since a CPR is non-excludable.
Conserved water satisﬁes these conditions. Non-conserving customers may freeride on conserving-customer eﬀorts. This paper investigates the water conservation
decision by experimentally testing the role of group size, information, and communication at mitigating free-rider behavior thus reconciling individual and collective
rationality.
From the time Gordon (1954) ﬁrst observed that over exploitation of a CPR
leads to the “tragedy of the commons,” CPR exploitation and measures to arrive at
the social optimum have been a popular theme in the economics literature. Given
the diﬃculty in gathering data necessary for addressing exploitation of the CPR,
experimental economics has been a useful tool for the analysis. Studies range from
those dealing with a single-stage framework (Walker et al., 1990; Walker and Gardner,
1992; Andreoni, 1993; Keser and Gardner, 1999) to those concerned with the role
of uncertainty in a dynamic framework (Moxnes, 1998; Budescu et al., 1995). Time
externalities (Herr et al., 1997; Chermak and Krause, 2002; Fischer et al., 2004) and
mitigating the eﬀects of over exploitation through cooperation (Mason and Polasky,
1997; Mason and Phillips, 1997; Tarui et al., 2008) have also been studied. This
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paper contributes to this literature by investigating a residential customer’s water
conservation decision experimentally in a single stage, public goods framework.
The motivation for this research is to ﬁnd factors that promote water conservation
and that may be feasibly implemented by an urban water manager. To that end I
consider three experimental treatments. The ﬁrst consideration is the level at which
conservation should be targeted. Does it make a diﬀerence if the manager encourages
conservation at the neighborhood level or the city-wide level? The consumer may act
diﬀerently if he or she feels social pressure from within the neighborhood to conserve
versus social pressure spread out over the entire city. Further, the consumption
decision of the individual may be impacted more by observations of the neighbor’s
water-use than that of residents in some other part of the city. Thus, the ﬁrst
treatment is group size. Second, the role of reciprocity and social norms may promote
conservation. An informed treatment sheds light on the extent to which observed
consumption of others impacts one’s own consumption. Finally, conservation may be
impacted by communication. This treatment investigates how communication with
group members enters the water-use decision.
The theoretical model is a voluntary contributions mechanism modiﬁed to capture
a voluntary conservation mechanism. I develop the optimal individual consumption
decision in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses the protocol, procedures, and treatments
for the experiment. Section 4.4 presents experiment results and conclusions are in
Section 4.5.

4.2

Conservation Model

This section models participant incentives in a voluntary conservation mechanism.
Based on the model, I identify possible strategies a participant might follow and
consider which combination of strategies constitute stable and unstable equilibria.
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4.2.1

A Voluntary Conservation Mechanism

Consider a hypothetical surface water allocation in an urban water system. In each
period, S units of water are available to the group of N consumers. There is no
carryover of S between periods. Storage is not an option. The single-stage framework
is analogous to considering a yearly allocation from which consumers make a water
consumption decision. S provides for water use for the consumers and is a public
good in the sense that it may recharge a groundwater aquifer that provides for
future consumers’ water needs, and is used to meet the demands of environmental,
agricultural, cultural, and recreational interests. These beneﬁts accrue outside of the
urban water system to which the N players belong, however, the urban consumers
beneﬁt from S as a public good at the rate α dollars per water unit where α > 1
is the public good to payoﬀ conversion factor. Thus, αS is the dollar value of the
surface water public good.
The urban consumers beneﬁt from the public good but they also make private
water use decisions. Each consumer i makes a private water consumption decision
qi to maximize their beneﬁts. The sum of consumption decisions over all consumers,
N

qi , reduces water that is available for the surface water public good. Thus, the
i=1

value of the public good becomes:
N

α S−

qi ,

(4.1)

i=1

which can be thought of as the value of surface water conservation. Note that i
indexes the participants in the group. Implicitly, then, the consumption decision qi
is also a conservation decision.
Participants can be of three consumer-types: low, medium, and high. Low types
value private water use less than medium types who in turn value private water use
less than do high types. With a normalized water price equal to one, and assuming
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a downward sloping individual water demand curve, participant i’s consumption
beneﬁts are:
a
Bik (qi ) = − qi2 + bk qi ,
2

(4.2)

where the vertical intercept term bk indexes consumer types: k = l, m, h for low,
medium, and high respectively. Beneﬁts by consumer type vary in absolute magnitude but not in elasticities since I assume these are net beneﬁts.
In each period participants make consumption decisions recognizing that private
consumption has an impact on the water-conservation public good. Per-period proﬁts
of consumer i, which are the payoﬀs earned by round, are:
⎤
⎡
N
q
S
−
i=1 i
a
⎦,
πik = − qi2 + bk qi + α ⎣
2
N

(4.3)

where the last term on the right-hand-side is the fraction of the public good that
beneﬁts the individual player. Participants get a private beneﬁt from consumption
as well as the N th part of the conserved public good, which increases with conservation. The consumer’s task is to optimally choose water consumption qi , which is the
decision that maximizes equation (4.3), and is:
πi kqi = 0 ⇔ −aqi + bk −

α
= 0.
N

(4.4)

The optimal consumption decision is found by solving equation (4.4) for qi∗ .
Before doing so, however, rearrangement of equation (4.4) provides useful insight.
−aqi + bk =

α
.
N

(4.5)

The left-hand-side of equation (4.5) is the marginal beneﬁt of private consumption
and the right-hand-side is the private marginal beneﬁt of conservation, which is the
private marginal beneﬁt of the public good.2 At the margin, the individual should
2 Note

that external beneﬁts to, for example, recreational users, do not appear in the
individual’s optimization problems as is standard for public goods and externalities.
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equate marginal beneﬁts of private consumption to private marginal beneﬁts of conservation. If marginal consumption beneﬁts are greater than marginal conservation
beneﬁts, then the individual should consume more; otherwise the individual should
consume less.
Table 4.1: Individually Optimal Consumption Decisions

Optimal Decision
N =3
Player Type
b
low 2.25
8
medium 2.5
9
high 2.75
10
k

Optimal Decision
N =12
10
12
13

a = 0.2, α = 2

The individually optimal consumption decisions in Table 4.1 is calculated as:
qi∗ =

α
bk
−
.
a
aN

(4.6)

where the parameters bk , a, and α were chosen by numerically testing the experiment
so that the expected participant payment was $30. The optimal decision for two
possible group sizes are given in Table 4.1. Conservation occurs if the player chooses
to consume an amount that is less than the individually optimal decision.

4.2.2

Strategies and Decisions

I assume there are four possible strategies a consumer may choose to follow given
the optimal solution. Strategies are related to behavior type to which there is a
corresponding consumption decision. There is a sub-optimal strategy, a non-optimal
strategy, one that is individually optimal and one that is socially optimal. Since the
model is at the decision level of the individual, assume that the social optimum is to
consume zero units. The strategies are shown in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Consumption Decisions and Strategies

Strategy
max consumption
beneﬁts
(sub-optimal)
race for
the resource
(non-optimal)
max consumption
and conservation
beneﬁts
(individually optimal)
max conservation
beneﬁts
(socially optimal)

Decision
bk
a

S
+
N

∗

Behavior

Strategic Consideration

incognizant

public good bears
no impact on decision

dominating

consume resource before
someone else does

bk
α
−
a
aN

competitive

0

cooperative

motivated self-interest
individual rationality

coordination
collective rationality

∗ If

all race for the resource the q’s are prorated, the max any player could get is
is  above average water per consumer.

The ﬁrst strategy in the table is for an individual whose behavior is incognizant
to the public good. A consumer of this type is one who makes a water consumption
decision that does not consider his or her own beneﬁt from the public good. The
decision is sub-optimal since it is made solely by maximizing private consumption
beneﬁts and not considering conservation beneﬁts. This ignorance could be due to
a number of factors. It may simply be the case that the consumer is not aware of
how conservation contributes to the public good and thus fails to recognize that the
N th part of total conservation increases his or her proﬁts. It could also be the case
that the consumer does recognize that there exists a conservation public good but
chooses to ignore it.
The race for the resource strategy is one that reﬂects dominating behavior. The
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decision is non-optimal since too much individual consumption leads to negative
marginal beneﬁts. From equation (4.3), diminishing beneﬁt from private consumption means that for each consumer type, there is a level of consumption where the
marginal beneﬁt of private consumption is negative. The consumer who follows this
strategy is one whose motives are not proﬁt maximizing. The motivation is simply to
consume more of the resource than any other consumer or to consume the resource
before someone else does. If all participants follow this strategy then the cumulative
consumption decision exceeds S. Participant decisions are prorated per the ratio of
S to cumulative consumption so that the most a participant actually gets is an
greater than average use, which is determined by the ratio.
Strategy three is individually optimal. This is the strategy for which private
marginal beneﬁts of consumption equal private marginal beneﬁts of conservation,
which is the public good. That is, this decision ensures the individual consumer the
maximum beneﬁts from consumption and conservation which make it an individually
rational decision if coordination breaks down.
The ﬁnal strategy is socially optimal since the consumption decision is zero, which
is analogous to assuming water use above a basic needs level.3 Since the model is
at the individual decision level, conservation is present for any consumption level
less than the individual optimum. Thus a consumption level of zero constitutes the
extreme conservation decision. If there is no consumption then there is no S subtraction. Because α > 1, total group value is maximized when S is maximized. The
strategy is to maximize beneﬁts from conservation and none from consumption. Per
Budescu et al.’s deﬁnition, this behavior is cooperative since it requires coordination
and collective rationality. It is also where the CPR dilemma is most apparent. If
3 The

restrictive assumption of the social optimum equal to zero units is analogous to
considering a customer’s water decision above a minimum, necessary threshold amount.
This assumes that basic water needs are met and that the participants decision is for units
above the critical, necessary minimum.
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S
in beneﬁts. If
N
one player defects from the coordinated strategy then the defector is better oﬀ and
all players follow a cooperative strategy then each player gets α

earns proﬁts per equation (4.3), those following coordination are worse oﬀ and get

S− N
i qi
α
. Herein lies the incentive to defect from the coordinated decision and
N
the clash between collective and individual rationality, a theme treated further in
the next section.

4.2.3

Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Equilibria

I now turn to a numerical example of the individually optimal and socially optimal
strategies shown in Table 4.2. With a numerical example, I identify the cooperative
equilibrium and the Nash, non-cooperative equilibrium.
The example relies on the parameters used in the small group experimental treatment discussed in Section 4.3 with N = 3, α = 2, and S = 34. The parameters of
the net beneﬁt function are a = 0.2 and bl , bm , bh , equal to 2.25, 2.5, and 2.75
respectively. These yield the payoﬀ matrix shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: A Three-Player Two-Choice Water Conservation Game Payoﬀ Matrix: row
player payoﬀ in bottom left, column player in top right
player high

social
strategy
individual
strategy

individual strategy

player medium
social strategy
individual strategy
23
17
23
31
23
17
17
11
17
26
29
23

player low

player low

social strategy



social
strategy
individual
strategy

player medium
social strategy
individual strategy
34
28
16
24
16
10
28
22
11
19
22
16



The socially optimal strategy in this framework is for all players in the group to
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choose zero units of consumption. If an agreement can be reached, and all players
maintain the agreement, the socially optimal solution returns a payoﬀ to each player
greater than the outcome from all players choosing the individually optimal decision.
However, the temptation to defect from the agreement may return to the defector
payoﬀs greater than the coordinated eﬀort.
Suppose a coordinated agreement is reached by the three players in the group
in which each player consumes zero units. Player high’s decision to hold to the
agreement places the analysis in the (a) matrix of the ﬁgure. Since player low (row
player) and player medium (column player) also hold to the agreement, and each
player earns 23. This cooperative equilibrium is an unstable point. The temptation
to defect threatens the equilibrium’s stability.
Player low has a six-unit incentive to defect. If players medium and high maintain
the social strategy, player low can increase his payoﬀs to 29 by choosing the individual
strategy. This, however, reduces the payoﬀs for the medium and high player to 17.
Player medium and high also face the temptation to defect. Player medium earns
31 by defecting when the others do not and player high could earn 34 by defecting
while the other two maintain the agreement.
The incentive to defect illustrates that the individual strategy is the dominant
strategy for each player. If all follow the dominant strategy the Nash, non-cooperative
solution obtains. The payoﬀ cell becomes matrix (b) SE. Each player’s payoﬀs are
less than the cooperative solution, matrix (a) NW, however each player does not
experience the same degree of mis-fortune. Player low suﬀers the greatest and player
high the least.
I now turn to the protocol, procedures, and treatments that are used in a water
conservation context of the experiment to investigate the role of group size, information, and communication at promoting reduced-use.
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4.3

Protocol, Procedure, and Treatments

Participants were recruited from among students and staﬀ at the University of New
Mexico (UNM) and adults from the greater Albuquerque, New Mexico population
using advertisements posted on Craig’s List and email list-serves.4 A total of 45
participants completed the experiment. Table 4.3 shows the treatment variables by
session which were conducted. Due to time constraints, round 5 in each session was
omitted however excess time allowed us to conduct an additional round in session 1.
Each session was conducted in English.
Table 4.3: Treatment Variables by Session

Session
1

Communication Group Size Uninformed
no
3
rounds 1 – 4

Informed
rounds 6 – 10

2

no

12

rounds 1 – 4

rounds 6 – 9

3

yes

3

rounds 1 – 4

rounds 6 – 9

4

yes

12

rounds 1 – 4

rounds 6 – 9

Participants were invited to participate in one of four sessions, approximately
one-hour each, held on separate evenings in one of the economics classrooms at
UNM. They were seated in such a way that no participant could readily look at
the answers provided by another. Participants were told that they could earn at
least $15 for participating and that the average participant payment was $30. Three
participants received $15 due to not being able to participate since some sessions
had more participants arrive than there were spaces available. The average payment
was $37 per participant.
The participants’ primary task was to make a water consumption decision. Water
consumption and water conservation convert to dollars, according to equation (4.3).
4 http://albuquerque.craigslist.org

last accessed 30 April 2009. Summary descriptive
statistics of participants shown in Table 4.4 in Section 4.4.
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Participants were randomly assigned to a group that shared a “Public Water Bucket”
containing water supply S. Each participant decided how much water, qi , from the
public bucket they would like to place in their “Private Water Bucket.” Participants
were told that water remaining in the public bucket at the end of the round doubles
and converts to an equal dollar payment for each group member.
I announced at the beginning of the experiment session that at the end of the
session two random draws from a bingo cage would determine which two rounds
constitute payment; payoﬀs for the two rounds would be summed. This gave the
participants an incentive to play each round as if that round was the one for which
payment would be made. Participants were not told the number of rounds in each
session. At the end of each round participants recorded their consumption decisions
and handed it to one of the experimenters. An experimenter seated at a computer
in another room recorded the data and returned to participants the decision sheet
with remaining water units in the public bucket and water that the participant gets
to keep. If demand was greater than supply, individual decisions were prorated by
the ratio of supply to demand. The returned decision sheet contained the payment
the participant would earn if that round were selected.
Each participant was given a packet of information. The packet included a “Returns from the Public Water Bucket.” This handout showed participants the payment that each group member would receive for each possible amount remaining in
the public bucket. It is calculated by doubling each water amount then dividing the
sum by the total number of players in the group thus the marginal per-capita return
2
2
(MPCR) from the conservation public good is
so that it was for small groups
N
3
1
and for large groups.
6
The packet also includes a “Returns from the Private Water Bucket.” There are
three versions of this handout that correspond to the three user-types that are disa
cussed in Section 4.2. These returns are calculated using − qi2 + bk qi from equation
2
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(4.3) where a = 0.2 and bl , bm , bh , are set at 2.25, 2.5, and 2.75 respectively. Participants see only their packet of information and are not told that private returns vary.
Each group in the small group treatment included one participant of each player
type. In the large group treatment each group included four participants of each
player type.

4.3.1

Group Size Treatment

The group size treatment, small (N = 3) and large (N = 12), was administered in
separate sessions. The motivation is to ﬁnd out if water conservation is promoted
more by dealing with it at a local, neighborhood level or at a city-wide level. Following Andreoni (1988), groups are not reconstituted between rounds. Doing this
allows for participants to experience learning behavior from other group members
while remaining anonymous. In a water conservation context it is useful since it is
analogous to living in the same neighborhood as other homeowners, observing their
water use behavior, but never actually meeting the neighbors.
α
. The small
N
group MPCR is 0.67 while the large group MPCR is 0.17. However, the large group
The group size treatment has implications for the MPCR since it is

treatment is scaled from the small group treatment. S for the small group is 34 and
for the large group is 136. This is analogous to there being a ﬁxed water supply
where beneﬁts from the conserved water public good are the same for participants
in either the small or large group treatment. There is an extant literature (Isaac and
Walker, 1988a,b; Isaac et al., 1994) that ﬁnds voluntary contributions to the public
good increase with group size yet that result is sensitive to the MPRC. Further,
Isaac et al. note that the group size eﬀect diminishes with the ability to organize
a group coalition. The group size treatment employed here is slightly diﬀerent in
that the public good is conservation of a resource, not a contribution to a public
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good. Per-unit beneﬁts to the individual from the public good are identical for both
treatments.

4.3.2

Information Treatment

One in-sample treatment, informed–uninformed, presents participants with information about the consumption decision of other players in the group. In each session,
the ﬁrst half of the session is the uniformed treatment with the informed treatment in
the second half. Information about players’ prior round consumption was displayed
on a bar graph. In the small group treatment the information is provided to the
participant with the decision-round sheet, in the large group treatment information
chart is displayed on an overhead projector. The information treatment parallels the
fact that a residential water user may see the outdoor consumption decision of his or
her neighbors and make a private water decision based on the observation of others.
The social norm eﬀect that is captured by the information treatment is not new.
Fehr and Gächter (2000) found that sanctions taken against free-riders was a primary consideration in participants’ decision not to free-ride and that sanctions could
come in the form of emotional frustrations from the group. Then Fischbacher et al.
(2001) found that experimental participants can often be characterized as ‘conditional cooperators’ since a private contribution decision is a function of the group’s
decision, a ﬁnding found again in Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). More recently Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) found that, on the part of the experimental participant,
the desire to live up to the expectation of the group was a major consideration in coordinated behavior. These ﬁndings suggest that for the water conservation problem
social norms and reciprocity may mitigate conservation free-riding.
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4.3.3

Communication Treatment

The communication treatment implements a group “discussion board.” At the beginning of each round, if a participant chooses to communicate, he or she writes on a
piece of paper a note that the experimenters photocopy onto a discussion board and
then distribute to the rest of the group. No identifying information is allowed in the
communication. Since conservation is voluntary, free-riding behavior is legal. This
means that the communication is non-binding, no penalties or punishments are enforced or allowed. Participants can simply communicate using the discussion board
with other group members. In a water conservation context the discussion board
simulates, for the small group treatment, a community newsletter that may discuss
water use or issues. For the large group treatment, the discussion board simulates a
newsletter that may be included with a customer’s water utility bill. Communication
of this form may appear futile at promoting conservation, however, researchers have
found it to increase contribution rates in public goods experiments.
Isaac and Walker (1988b) found that communication clearly increases provision
of a public good. Their experiment allowed participants to communicate face-to-face
for four minutes prior to making the contribution decision. In this exchange, participants could speak freely about anything except their private information in the
experiment. The result was that the trend for mean contributions increased when
communication was allowed. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) ﬁnd a similar conclusion, their experiments suggest that communication increases the group’s ability to
coordinate eﬀorts. More recently Bochet et al. (2006) investigated communication
in the presence of punishment to which they found that face-to-face communication
improves contributions more than punishments. Their next best communication alternative was a chat-room scenario where participants read comments from group
members over a computer. The discussion board closely parallels the chat-room type
set up since communication is within the group and anonymous.
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4.4

Data, Results, and Interpretation

This section discusses the data gathered in the experiment, the results, hypothesis
testing, and interpretation of results.

4.4.1

Participants and Data
Table 4.4: Survey Descriptive Statistics

Variable
Survey (N = 45)

Mean or
percentage Min.

Age
Female
Renter
UNM Student

27.9
49
58
76

Education∗
Less than High School
High School
Some College or Associates
Bachelors
Masters or equivalent
Doctor or professional

2
18
59
14
9
2

Income
Less than 40,000
40,000 to 60,000
60,000 to 100,000
Greater than 100,000

60
21
12
7

∗ Percentages

18

Max. S.D.
70

12.5

may not add to 100 due to rounding.

At the end of the experiment, participants completed a short survey. The purpose was to gather basic demographic data and to get an understanding of general
water conservation preferences of the participants. Table 4.4 shows the descriptive
statistics of the people who participated. There were a total of 45 participants in
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the experiment, 76 percent of whom were students. This most likely explains why
58 percent of the participants were renters, 59 percent had some college education,
and 60 percent had income less than $40,000.
Figure 4.2: Survey Question “Reasons to Conserve by Future Use”: 1 indicates most
important and 5 least important
100%

5
5
5
4

5

4

80%

4
3

5

3

4

60%
3
2

2

3
40%

4
2

3
2

20%
1

1

1

2
1

1

0%
Household

Children and
Grandchildren

New Residents

Economic
Development

Environment

A ranking question investigated participants’ opinions about reasons to conserve
in which one was the most important and ﬁve the least important. The possible
answers included: for your household, for your children and grandchildren, for new
residents to Albuquerque, for economic development, and for the environment. Figure 4.2 illustrates participants’ rankings. Nearly 40 percent ranked children and
grandchildren as the most important reason to conserve closely followed by own
household. New residents was the least important reason to conserve: more than 40
percent ranked it the lowest.
The conservation preference result informs urban water managers why conser-
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vation is important to consumers. The fact that the average participant indicated
conservation for children and grandchildren was more important than for the household implies that consumers may not feel that the short-term water supply is as
threatened as the long-term supply. Further, the average participant ranked environmental needs over economic development and new Albuquerque residents. Water
managers may need to re-deﬁne management to reﬂect a sustainable water supply for
following generations of existing customers and environmental needs, not necessarily
economic development and urban sprawl.
Table 4.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the experiment. Four sessions produced a total of 369 observations. Recall that the information treatment was insample and that the Public Bucket units for the small group treatment was 34 and
for the large group it was 136. The mean water decisions across the sessions was
9.1 which is consistent with individual rational behavior and motivated self-interest.
The minimum private decision was zero which suggests that some participants followed the strategy of collective rationality. The maximum decision was 122 which ﬁts
with dominating behavior and a race-for-the-resource strategy since the maximum
an incognizant player would have chosen is 10, 12, or 13 based on player type.
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Variable
Session 1: No Communication, Small Group
Private decision
Total group decision
Remaining public water
Player type – Low (q ∗ = 8)
Player type – Medium (q ∗ = 9)
Player type – High (q ∗ = 10)
Session 2: No Communication, Large Group
Private decision
Total group decision
Remaining public water
Player type – Low (q ∗ = 10)
Player type – Medium (q ∗ = 12)
Player type – High (q ∗ = 13)
Session 3: Communication, Small Group (N
Private decision
Total group decision
Remaining public water
Player type – Low (q ∗ = 8)
Player type – Medium (q ∗ = 9)
Player type – High (q ∗ = 10)
Session 4: Communication, Large Group (N
Private decision
Total group decision
Remaining public water
Player type – Low (q ∗ = 10)
Player type – Medium (q ∗ = 12)
Player type – High (q ∗ = 13)

91
= 96)

= 96)

(N = 96)

(N = 81)

7.4
88.6
47.4
5.0
8.0
9.2

6.15
18.5
15.6
5.6
5.9
7.0

14.8
177.5
0
13.1
12.1
19.2

7.9
23.7
10.3
6.3
8.0
9.4

Mean

0
55
13
0
0
0

0
4
0
1
0
0

0
154
0
4
0
0

1
12
0
1
1
5

Min.

Table 4.5: Experimental Descriptive Statistics

4.2
8.7
8.5
3.6
3.9
5

14.4
25.8
0
10.5
8.5
20.6

3.5
6.4
6.3
2.7
44
2.4

S.D.

20
4.8
123 26.34
81 24.8
10
3.6
13
5.0
20
4.8

15
35
30
12
12
15

122
227
0
69
50
122

16
34
22
11
16
15

Max.
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Conservation behavior was present in Session 1, 3, and 4 since the mean private
water decision is less than the individually optimal consumption levels given in Table
4.1. Although the pure socially optimal strategy was not reached, some coordinated
behavior existed which implies that participants did not act completely out of selfinterest. The mean private water decision in Session 2 indicates that there was at
least incognizant behavior present although it is more likely the case that dominating
behavior was present since the mean private decision is greater than 14, the maximum
incognizant player decision. The clear strategy of Session 2 was race-for-the-resource
behavior.
The conservation results are uniform across the heterogeneous users in the experiment, with varying player types conservation is observed in each session except
Session 2. High player types in every session had the highest average consumption
and low player types had the lowest. Using the decision ratio, constructed in the
next section, the low player types demonstrated the greatest amount of conservation
in Sessions 1 and 4. The medium player types conserved the most in Sessions 2 and
3.
Now I consider the results by session rounds and treatments.

4.4.2

Deconstructing Participant Decisions

The extent to which participants exhibit conservation behavior is considered using
a decision ratio (DR). The DR is the ratio of the private water decision that participants made in the experiment to the individually optimal decisions from Table 4.1.
The following relationships hold.
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DR = 0 ⇒ social optimum, collective rationality
< 1 ⇒ some conservation, coordinated behavior
= 1 ⇒ individual optimum, individual rationality
> 1 ⇒ dominating or incognizant behavior
≥ 1.1 → dominating behavior, small group
≥ 1.4 → dominating behavior, large group
Figure 4.3 shows the mean DR by round and by group size. The left panel is
the mean DR result for the large group size and the right panel is the result for
the small group size. The ﬁgure shows that complete collective rationality was not
observed, the mean DR never reached zero. However, recall from Table 4.5 that for
three sessions conservation was observed. The ﬁgure shows this as rounds where the
DR is less than one, which suggests that there was some coordinated behavior and
not purely motivated self-interest.
The diﬀerence in mean DR results within group size is primarily due the role
of communication that is illustrated by the diﬀerence between the dashed and solid
lines in both panels. For the large group size, when communication is not present,
dominating behavior was the result in each round. This is consistent with Isaac
et al. (1994) who ﬁnd that the ability to coordinate as a group diminishes as group
size increases. For the small group size, the diﬀerence from communication was less.
Round two, small group and no communication, is the only point in the small group
treatment where conservation was not observed since the DR is less than one in all
other rounds. With the exception of round four in the small group treatment, the
mean DR is always less with communication. This suggests that communication
plays a role in promoting coordinated behavior and conservation.
The information treatment provided participants a bar-chart that displayed individual group member decisons in rounds six through nine. Round ﬁve, which was

93

Chapter 4. Investigating the Water Conservation Decision

Figure 4.3: Mean Decision Ratio (DR) by Rounds. Vertical line indicates round in which
information became present.
Small Group, N=3

1
0

.5

Mean DR

1.5

2

Large Group, N=12

1

3

5

7

9

1

3

5

7

9

Round
Communication

No Communication

omitted in the experiment, is an information reference point on each panel. The information results vary. I consider the participants’ DR for each session to ascertain
the eﬀect of information and begin with the small group treatments; Session 1 and
3.
Figure 4.4 shows the participants’ DR for each group. The ﬁgure is for Session
1, which is a small group treatment without communication. Each line represents
the DR of an individual player and in this ﬁgure is labeled by player type. The
vertical gray line indicates the point at which information became present. For these
participants, the DRs converged when information was present. The DR of the high
player types, the dotted lines, were not impacted by information as much as other
player types. Medium player types responded the most to information; their DRs
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Figure 4.4: Decision Ratio (DR) by Rounds and Player Type: Session 1, No Communication, Small Group. Vertical line indicates round in which information
became present.
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changed the most from the ﬁrst half of the session to the second. The low player
type DRs increased with information except for the low player in Group 1 where the
DR decreased.
Figure 4.5 presents the results from Session 3, which is a small group treatment
with communication. These results are similar to the previous ﬁgure since the DRs
with information became more closely grouped. Recall from Table 4.5 that Session 3
was the one where conservation was most observed; the mean private water decision
was less than other sessions. The ﬁgure shows that this result may have been driven
by Groups 2 and 4; the DR was the least for participants in these groups. Consistent
with Session 1 results, the DR of player type high changed the least with information
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Figure 4.5: Decision Ratio (DR) by Rounds and Player Type: Session 3, Communication,
Small Group. Vertical line indicates round in which information became
present.
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except in Group 4 where the DR increased. The DR of medium type players is mixed,
some increased with information (Group 3 and 4) while others decreased (Group 1
and 2). The low player type DR in Group 3 bears out an altruistic result; the other
two player is Group 3 had large DRs while the low player remained with a constant,
small DR strategy. The Session 3 results illustrate how conservation on the part of
some players may oﬀset the over consumption by others, even if it is dominating
behavior. The mean private decision was the least in Session 3.
The average DR in the large group treatment was greater. Figures 4.6 and 4.7
show the DR by participant since there was a single group in the large group treatment. Each row of the ﬁgures corresponds to player type; low, medium, and high
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Figure 4.6: Decision Ratio (DR) by Rounds and Player Type: Session 2, No Communication, Large Group. Vertical line indicates round in which information
became present.
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and there were four participants of each type.
Figure 4.6 shows that there was considerable variation in the DR. The DR of
some participants changed dramatically throughout the session while for others, the
DR remained relatively unchanged. Recall from Figure 4.3 that the mean DR for
Session 2 stabilized with the presence of information. This result is observed here in
that for many of the Session 2 participants, the variation in the DR decreased with
information. Further recall that the mean private decision was the greatest in Session
2. This ﬁts with ten of the DRs illustrating incognizant or dominating behavior for
all rounds and for two participants that began with conservation behavior following
suit. Many of the players started with a low decision that increased over rounds.
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Figure 4.7: Decision Ratio (DR) by Rounds and Player Type: Session 4, Communication,
Large Group. Vertical line indicates round in which information became
present.
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Figure 4.7 presents the results for the ﬁnal session, which was a large group with
communication. The participants’ DR is lower in this session than in the previous
large group session. Here the role of information was to stabilize the DR of four
participants while for six it increased. In conjunction with the small group and
information, results suggests that free-riding behavior in a small group is mitigated
to a larger extent than in a large group and that information inﬂuences that result.
Participants made lower consumption decisions when communication was present.
The theme from participant communication was to put less water into the private
bucket. The following are a sample comments that were placed on the discussion
board.
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“So are we switching to the 6-unit plan?”
“We need more lower numbers guys!”
“Keep your private water bucket amount (what you keep) low – we make more
by having more water left in the public water bucket.”
“Yeah, if we all use less water we can make more. Good idea.”
“What happened to taking only 2 units for private bucket?”
“Each of us would get $23 a round if we all took 3 water units a round, which
I believe is the most we can make without cheating each other.”
Not all participants submitted comments for the discussion board. However, participants generally increased their use of the discussion board as the session went
on. This sample shows that players generally used communication to coordinate
consumption decisions and maximize payoﬀs.
Based on these ﬁndings, I construct three hypotheses that are tested in the next
section.

4.4.3

Hypothesis Testing and Interpretation

In this section I test the impact of the treatment variables on the DR. Since data were
collected from diﬀerent samples of the population, I use non-parametric methods to
test the hypotheses and discuss these and the urban water implications here.
Non-parametric testing is a method to compare two distributions drawn from
diﬀerent samples. The treatment variables group size and communication were administered in separate sessions so that the data is from separate samples. To test the
impact of these I use the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test, where the null hypothesis is that
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the relative frequency of the DR distribution is identical within treatments. The information treatment was administered within a single session thus the data are from
the same population. To compare distributions drawn from the same population I
use the Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test, where the null hypothesis is that the DRs without
information are identical to the DRs with information.
Two of the four sessions were administered with group size equal to three, two
had group size equal to 12. The ﬁrst null hypothesis is:
H0 : DRsmall = DRlarge .
Table 4.6 shows the mean DR under each group size treatment, the hypothesis, and
the z-score by which the null hypothesis is rejected. The probability that the DR is
greater in the large group size is 0.69.
Table 4.6: Decision Ratio by Group Size and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test

Size Obs. Mean Min. Max. S.D.
Small
177
0.77
0 1.78 0.43
Large 192
1.22
0 12.2
1.2

Hypothesis

z

0.77 = 1.22 6.15

Reject

yes

For the urban water manager, rejecting the null suggests that group size does
make a diﬀerence in the consumption decision. In the small group treatment the
mean DR was 0.77, which implies that some conservation behavior existed. Recall
that if the DR is one, the participant followed a strategy of individual rationality.
The small group size suggests that participants were not being completely, individually rational and followed a strategy towards collective rationality and coordinated
behavior. The mean DR in the large group size was 1.22, which suggests the average player was incognizant to the public good. For the manager, this implies that
promoting conservation at a smaller group level promotes reduced water use more
than at the large group level. This suggests that customers may be more likely to
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conserve if the problem is addressed at a neighborhood level. A city-wide approach
may obviate the customer’s ability to see conservation beneﬁts and actually promote
free-riding behavior.
Information was an in-sample treatment so that the data from both treatments
were from the identical sample population. The uninformed half of the treatment was
administered in rounds one through four, round ﬁve was omitted, and the information
treatment was in rounds six through nine. The null hypothesis for information is:
H0 : DRinf o = DRno inf o .
If information does not play a role in the participant’s decision, there should be no
diﬀerence between the two treatments. The mean DR for the informed treatment
and the results of the Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test are in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Decision Ratio by Information and Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Test

Informed
Yes
No

Obs. Mean Min. Max. S.D.
144
0.97
0.1
2.2 0.52
225
1.03
0 12.2 1.13

Hypothesis

z

0.97 = 1.03 -3.29

Reject

yes

Since the null is rejected, information does play a role in the participant’s decision
yet the mean DR for both treatments is very close to the individual strategy level.
The results in the previous ﬁgures illustrate that the role of information varies. In
some sessions the mean DR increases with information and in others it decreases.
In the large group where conservation was present, the information treatment shows
that the mean DR increased. The small group suggests that information may decrease the decision. I performed the sign-rank test for the information hypothesis on
each group size. For each case, z = -2.6 for small and z = -2.1 for large, the null is
rejected, however, information may be conditional on group size.
The information result has implications for an urban water manager depending
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on the level to which conservation is targeted. In a large group approach, information
may actually increase water use whereas in the small group approach information
may reduce water use. This strengthens the group size result; in a large group size,
if a customer sees that lots of people are not conserving the individual may also not
conserve.
Communication was administered in Sessions three and four. The null hypothesis
for the communication treatment is
H0 : DRcomm = DRno comm .
Table 4.8 shows the mean DR under both treatments and the results of the ranksum test. The greatest diﬀerence in the mean DR of all three treatment variables is
in the communication treatment. Without communication, the average participant
engaged in incognizant behavior since the mean DR is 1.29. Further, the probability
that the mean DR is less with communication is 0.71. This result ﬁts with Isaac and
Walker (1988b) who ﬁnd that public good contributions increase with communication
and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) who ﬁnd that communication increases the ability
of the group to engage in coordinated behavior.
Table 4.8: Decision Ratio by Communication and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test

Comm. Obs. Mean Min.
Yes
192
0.75
0
No
177
1.29
0

Max. S.D.
2 0.49
12.2 0.49

Hypothesis

z

0.75 = 1.29 7.12

Reject

yes

For the water manager, the communication result suggests that promoting water
discussion amongst the users may decrease water use thus promoting conservation.
The DR was less in the communication treatment which implies that communication
may increase the group’s ability for coordinated decision making. With the group
size result, communication suggests that small community organization may be more
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eﬀective at promoting conservation than city-wide encouragement. At the community level with communication, motivated self-interest may give way to collective
rationality.

4.5

Conclusions and Extensions

Increasingly scarce water resources suggest that entities who demand water will have
to make do with less. For urban dwellers this means water conservation will become a larger consideration. Thus, understanding factors that promote conservation
should be of concern to urban water managers. In this paper I develop a voluntary
conservation mechanism to investigate three, non-price, demand-side management
tools that promote conservation.
Three experimental treatments are used that parallel water management options
that an urban water manager may adopt to promote water conservation. Varying
group size simulates water management at the local, neighborhood level and at the
larger, city-wide level. Provision of information about users’ decisions is analogous
to a manager informing residents of water use within their neighborhood or water use
across the city. The communication treatment is similar to a community newsletter
or city-wide bill insert depending on group size.
I ﬁnd that a large group size with no communication produces the least conservation. Participants choose to consume as much as they can prior to the consumption
of another, however, this result may be sensitive to the single-stage framework. A
small group size with communication produces the most coordinated behavior. Results show that information plays a role in the player decision, however, the impact
varies by treatment. Information in a large group with no communication tends to
stabilize player decisions. In that setting communication increases the amount of water privately consumed. In the small group treatment, consumption increases when
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information is present without communication but decreases with communication.
I use the Wilcoxon, non-parametric method to test the hypothesis that each of the
treatments impact the participants’ consumption decision. The null is rejected in
each case.
The results suggest urban water policy implications for managers. First, experiment participants conserved more in the small group size. This suggests that a neighborhood approach to conservation may produce better results than at the city-wide
level. Second, information about the water use decision of other participants impacts
individual consumption. In the large group size it tends to increase consumption and
in small groups in tends to decrease consumption. This strengthens the argument for
approaching conservation at a neighborhood level over city-wide. Third, the participants’ consumption is less in the presence of communication. Together, these three
results imply that a community organized approach to conservation may be more
eﬀective than city-wide encouragement to conserve.
There are a series of extensions that will increase the information on the individual
conservation decision. The ﬁrst is to econometrically estimate the impact of sociodemographic and conservation preferences that are in the survey data. This will allow
for generalization of the sample results to the larger population and take a closer
look at how these impact community organization and the likelihood of increased
conservation. Based on the information found here, in another series of experiments
I would like to investigate conservation as a social norm to see how information and
group expectations impact the decision.
Increased water scarcity implies that sustainable management practices are of
increasing need. The results in this paper suggest that a community organized approach to water conservation may be a useful, non-price, demand-side management
planning tool. Public good beneﬁts that accrue to users outside of the urban system
can inﬂuence the customer decision if customers know about them and collectively

104

Chapter 4. Investigating the Water Conservation Decision

engage in a coordinated eﬀort. Thus, a community organized approach to conservation is another tool in the water manager’s arsenal of eﬀective water policies.
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Concluding Remarks

Urban water managers face two primary concerns; failing infrastructure and increasing scarcity. As the U.S. water infrastructure continues to age, and as long as managers can successfully prevent disruptions to consumers, dealing with infrastructure
repair and replacement will be an issue left at the level of the local utility. Federal
assistance is linked to voter interest; managers that successfully minimize service interruptions suppress voter outcry. This means that utility managers will have to ﬁnd
ways to address infrastructure issues from within. At the same time, increased water
scarcity means that managers will have to get customers to use less water or face
deleterious consequences. The three papers in this dissertation address components
of these two urban water policy concerns. The ﬁrst paper focused on optimal water
infrastructure investment. The second paper identiﬁed optimal pumping, eﬃcient
water prices, and simulated utility proﬁts that could be used to address infrastructure issues. The third paper considered a non-price, demand-side policy option for
promoting conservation.
The sum of water infrastructure investment shortfalls at the utility level across
the U.S. are estimated at $23 billion annually (WIN, 2000a). The water utility data
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from the AWWA that I use suggests that the average U.S. water utility that serves in
excess of 50,000 people faces a $21 million annual shortfall. Over 20 years, estimated
need reaches as much as $2.2 trillion (WIN, 2000b). Infrastructure investment gaps
are a multi-year, multi-billion dollar problem. Compounding the problem is that
water delivery is a silent service, people are not generally concerned about water
infrastructure until they are personally impacted. In aggregate, this implies that
federal response may not be adequate until the level of service disruptions nationwide elicit voter response. Consequently, dealing with infrastructure shortages is a
problem largely left to water utility managers.
The model in Chapter 2 oﬀers a tool water resource managers can use to mitigate
investment shortfalls. In an optimal control theory framework, using an adjustment
cost model, I model the path of optimal infrastructure investment. The model reveals three important considerations. The eﬀects of population, system capacity,
and policy impact the investment path, which suggests that the manager can shift
policy towards optimal investment by considering these. Thus, the model serves as
a guideline since choosing investment optimally mitigates investment shortfalls.
The second policy concern is that water supplies are increasingly scarce. In order
to avoid water shortages, people will need to use less. This, combined with the identiﬁed need for water infrastructure investment, motivates the “two-for-one” consideration that I analyze in Chapter 3. The question is: can a water resource manager
solve water scarcity and infrastructure shortfalls by implementing scarcity prices?
To answer this question, groundwater availability constrains the social welfare maximization model in an optimal control theory framework. The diﬀerential equation
system that is the solution contains a path of optimal groundwater pumping, from
it optimal water prices are identiﬁed. Optimal water prices occur where price equals
the sum of marginal production cost and marginal user cost. The marginal user cost
is the opportunity cost placed on all future water users for water that is used today.
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Chapter 3 presents a comparison of simulation results from the optimal water
use program and the status quo alternative, which I characterize as one where water
prices increase at the rate of inﬂation. Over a 40-year time horizon, using Albuquerque, New Mexico as a test case, I consider impacts to the height of the water
table, society, and the ﬁnancial impact to the water provider. The results indicate
that current water prices are approximately 20 percent of the price level that includes
the marginal user cost, the level that signals water scarcity. The optimal price path
preserves 21.6 feet of water table height over the alternative. The results shed light
on the importance of modifying current regulatory pricing barriers. Optimal water pricing preserves aquifer height, generates revenue for capital investment, and
reduces monthly water use at the individual level thus promoting conservation.
Increased water scarcity suggests that entities who compete for this ﬁnite resource will have to make-do with less. For the urban dweller, this implies water
conservation; for the urban water manager, this implies ﬁnding ways to promote
conservation. Chapter 4 considers a non-price, demand-side management alternative to investigate water conservation. Conserved water is an impure public good
since it is non-excludable and rival in consumption. These features mean that it is
susceptible to free-riding behavior by water users. The water user-group may know
that overall, everyone needs to use less water but individually may not be inclined to
do so. This dichotomy between private and public interests is labeled collective versus individual rationality in the literature (Budescu et al., 1995). The experimental
application in Chapter 4 considers three possible ways to overcome that dichotomy.
The three experimental treatments that I implement, group size, information,
and communication, parallel management policies a manager may adopt. Group size
sheds light on the level, neighborhood or city-wide, at which conservation should be
promoted. Information provides insight as to how water consumption of others impact one’s own water use. Communication shows how a coordinated eﬀort may reduce
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water use. The results suggest that a small group size with communication decrease
consumer water consumption. The impact of information is mixed and varies with
group size. In a small group setting the presence of information causes consumption
decisions to decline and converge. In a large group it increases consumption decisions. The highest level of individual consumption occurs in a large group. These
results suggest that an organized, neighborhood approach to water conservation is
more successful at reducing consumption than city-wide encouragement.
There are a series of extensions to this dissertation that will continue to broaden
the understanding of eﬃcient urban policy in the context of drought and economic
uncertainties. The model of optimal water infrastructure investment is at the level
of the utility and general infrastructure. First, an extension to the investment model
that disaggregates infrastructure will shed light on how the eﬀects of population, aging capital, and policy impact speciﬁc infrastructure types. It may be the case that
the impacts from these three eﬀects are not the same across transmission mains,
pumping systems, or treatment facilities. Second, the optimal pumping model relies
on certain groundwater recharge. Extending it to make recharge stochastic and modeling surface water as part of available supply will provide useful insights on optimal
water use, especially in times of drought. Estimating the cost function as a trans-log
will pick up groundwater, well-speciﬁc eﬀects. Third, econometrically estimating the
consumer water decision with experimental treatment variables and survey data will
provide for greater characterization of consumption versus conservation. Finally, in
another experiment, conservation could be modeled as a social norm to investigate
how this impacts the consumption decision of new users to the water system.
The three papers in this dissertation collectively speak to water utility, ﬁnancial
stability and water sustainability. The models inform policy makers of factors that
promote optimal infrastructure investment, groundwater pumping, and conservation.
The ﬁndings here are consequential since water managers can use them on the path
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to more eﬃcient water management. Extending this research will continue to ﬁnd
ways to deal with ﬁnancing and replacing infrastructure, arriving at optimal water
use, and making water conservation a social norm.
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Appendix A
Econometric Model of Optimal
Investment
Transforming theory model (2.20) and (2.21) into econometric model
(2.22) and (2.23) to derive estimators in Table 2.2

ṁ =

[pfk − c] + [(δ + η + r)(pfm − g)] − [pfmk (m − (η + δ)k)]
.
pfmm

(A.20)

Substituting in r = η − ρ then distributing terms yields:
ṁ =

pfk − c + (δ + 2η − ρ)pfm − (δ + 2η − ρ)g − pfmk k̇
.
pfmm

Divide through by denominator then gather terms according to data variables (var):
c, g, p, m, and k. Thus model equation (2.20) becomes regression equation (2.22).
ṁ =

fk + (δ + 2η − ρ)fm
fmm
β0

−

1
fmm
β1

c
(δ + 2η − ρ)
−
p
fmm
var
β2
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g
fmk
−
p
fmm
var
β3

k̇
var

Appendix A. Econometric Model of Optimal Investment

Δmi = β0 + β1

cit
git
+ β2 + β3 Δki + γi zij +
pit
pit

(A.22)

1

The second part of the model is
k̇ = m − (δ + η)k.

(A.21)

The econometric version of (2.21) becomes econometric equation (2.23).
k̇ =

0

+1

m

−(δ + η)

k

α0

α1

var

α2

var

Δki = α0 + α1 mit + α2 kit + γi zij +

2.
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(A.23)

Appendix B
Experiment Protocol Treatments

B.1

Small Group – No Communication

Welcome to this experiment on water use decision-making. Thank you for participating. We expect that this experiment will take approximately one hour.
This experiment will consist of several separate rounds. Your group will start each
round with 34 water units in your “Public Water Bucket.” During each round you
might choose to take some water from the “Public Water Bucket” and place it in
your “Private Water Bucket” or you may choose not to take any.
In each round you will be in a group of three people. We will not tell you who
the other members of your group are, and we will not tell any other participants
whether or not you are in their group. The members of your group will remain the
same throughout the experiment; therefore you will be in the same group of three
participants for all rounds.
Your earnings for the experiment are based on the amount of water in your “Private
Water Bucket” and remaining water in the “Public Water Bucket.” You may place
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any amount of water in your “Private Water Bucket” that you wish in whole amounts
(i.e. no fractions). However, if the total water demand of your group exceeds that
which is available in the “Public Water Bucket,” each member of your group receives
a prorated portion of the privately desired amount to put in their “Private Water
Bucket.”
Remaining water in the “Public Bucket” increases by a factor of two and each person
in your group gets an equal share. This means that the trick is to decide how much
water to put in your “Private Bucket” so that you earn as much money as you can.
[DISTRIBUTE THREE HANDOUTS NOW]
The handouts “Returns from the Public Water Bucket” and “Returns from the Private Water Bucket” show you how remaining water and water convert to earnings
expressed in dollars. At the end of each round, the experimenters will record water
you get to put in your “Private Water Bucket,” your groups remaining water in the
“Public Water Bucket,” and your payment for that round. For your records, you
may record the same information on the “Decision and Earnings” handout. That is,
you will record the water you get to keep and the associated earnings under “Your
Decision.” Under “Group Decision” you will record water remaining in the “Public
Water Bucket” and the associated earnings. You will add the private and public
earnings [columns (a) and (b)] to see the amount you earned on that round.
However, we will not pay you for every round. The bingo cage will contain one
number for each round you play. For example, if we complete ﬁve rounds, numbers
one through ﬁve will be placed in this bingo cage. The numbers I draw from the
cage will determine the rounds for which you will be paid. Since each number has an
equal chance of being drawn, you should play each round as if it is a round that will
count towards your payment. We will draw two rounds and add your total earnings
from each round to determine your payment.
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Here is how you will complete the ﬁrst round of this experiment:
Your group has 34 water units in the “Public Water Bucket”. You determine the
amount you would like to place in your “Private Water Bucket.” There is a chance
that the total demand of your group exceeds 34. If it does, we will prorate the
individually desired amount and let you know how many water units you get to
keep.
Here is how we prorate when water demand exceeds water supply:
First we determine the total water demand for your group by adding the individual
decisions. Then we divide the available supply 34, by the total demand to get a
ratio. We multiply that ratio by your individual decision and that is how much you
get to keep.
That sounds like a lot of math: dont worry. We will calculate that for you and let
you know how much of your desired water you get to keep.
Here is an example of how this works:
If each person in your group demands 15 water units, total demand is 45, which is
greater than the available 34 units. The experimenter prorates the amount that each
player gets to keep and reports to you that you get 11 water units. You look at your
“Returns from the Private Water Bucket” handout and if, for example, it said that
11 units earn you $14 dollars your “Private Bucket Earnings” would be $14. One
unit remains in the “Public Water Bucket.” That earns you and each participant in
your group $1 dollar. Thus, your total earnings for this hypothetical round would
be $15 dollars.
Here is another example:
If each person in your group demands zero water units, total demand is zero and 34
water units remain in the “Public Water Bucket.” You look at the “Returns from
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the Public Water Bucket” handout to see that 34 units earn $23 for each participant
in your group. That means that for this hypothetical round you would earn zero
dollars from your “Private Water Bucket” and $23 from the groups “Public Water
Bucket” so that $23 would be your total earnings and the total earnings of each
player in your group.
Does anyone have any questions about this part of the experiment?
Remember:
You may choose any number of water units that you like for your “Private Water
Bucket.”
The number of water units that you get to keep depends on total water demand and
water supply.
Please write your ID number, shown on your “Decision and Earnings” handout, on
the form the experimenters are handing to you.
Please do not talk or communicate with any other participant. Please do not look
at the paperwork of other players and please keep all your paperwork and decisions
private. A folder has been provided for you to enclose your paperwork at the end of
each round.
After you have made your decision, please fold your decision sheet in half, write your
ID# on the outside of the sheet, and hand it to one of the assistants.
This concludes Round 5. Please write your ID# on the outside of your folded Round
form. Once all Round forms have been gathered, the experimenters will determine
the water units you get to keep in your Private Water Bucket and the remaining
water units in the Public Water Bucket and return the form to you.
Round 6, and each remaining round of this experiment will be diﬀerent.

117

Appendix B. Experiment Protocol Treatments

At the conclusion of this round, we will enter your Private Bucket decision onto a
chart on the decision round sheet of your group members.
The chart will display the Private Bucket decision of each participant in your group
although individual participants will remain anonymous. You will not know who
the other participants in your group are; you will only know the amount that they
requested from the Public Water Bucket. Your decision will also be displayed anonymously; your group members will not know your identity.
The only participant information you will know will be your own since your decision
will correspond to one of the participants on the chart.
Now please make your Round 6 decision.

B.2

Large Group – No Communication

Welcome to this experiment on water use decision-making. Thank you for participating. We expect that this experiment will take approximately one hour.
This experiment will consist of several separate rounds. Your group will start each
round with 136 water units in your “Public Water Bucket.” During each round you
might choose to take some water from the “Public Water Bucket” and place it in
your “Private Water Bucket” or you may choose not to take any.
Your earnings for the experiment are based on the amount of water in your “Private
Water Bucket” and remaining water in the “Public Water Bucket.” You may place
any amount of water in your “Private Water Bucket” that you wish in whole amounts
(i.e. no fractions). However, if the total water demand of your group exceeds that
which is available in the “Public Water Bucket,” each member of your group receives
a prorated portion of the privately desired amount to put in their Private Water
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Bucket.
Remaining water in the “Public Bucket” increases by a factor of two and each person
in your group gets an equal share. This means that the trick is to decide how much
water to put in your “Private Bucket” so that you earn as much money as you can.
[DISTRIBUTE THREE HANDOUTS NOW]
The handouts “Returns from the Public Water Bucket” and “Returns from the Private Water Bucket” show you how remaining water and water convert to earnings
expressed in dollars. You will record on the “Decision and Earnings” handout three
pieces of important information. You will record the water you get to keep and the
associated earnings under “Your Decision.” Under Group Decision you will record
water remaining in the “Public Water Bucket” and the associated earnings. You will
add the private and public earnings [columns (a) and (b)] to see the amount you
earned on that round.
However, we will not pay you for every round. The bingo cage will contain one
number for each round you play. For example, if we complete ﬁve rounds, numbers
one through ﬁve will be placed in this bingo cage. The numbers I draw from the
cage will determine the rounds for which you will be paid. Since each number has an
equal chance of being drawn, you should play each round as if it is a round that will
count towards your payment. We will draw two rounds and add your total earnings
from each round to determine your payment.
Here is how you will complete the ﬁrst round of this experiment:
Your group has 136 water units in the “Public Water Bucket.” You determine the
amount you would like to place in your “Private Water Bucket.” There is a chance
that the total demand of your group exceeds 136. If it does, we will prorate the
individually desired amount and let you know how many water units you get to
keep.

119

Appendix B. Experiment Protocol Treatments

Here is how we prorate when water demand exceeds water supply:
First we determine the total water demand for your group by adding the individual
decisions. Then we divide the available supply 136, by the total demand to get a
ratio. We multiply that ratio by your individual decision and that is how much you
get to keep.
That sounds like a lot of math: dont worry. We will calculate that for you and let
you know how many of your desired water units you get to keep.
Here is an example of how this works:
If each person in your group demands 15 water units, total demand is 180, which
is greater than the available 136 units. The experimenter prorates the amount that
each player gets to keep and reports to you that you get 11 water units. You look at
your “Returns from the Private Water Bucket” handout and if, for example, it said
that 11 units earn you $14 dollars your “Private Bucket Earnings” would be $14.
Four units remain in the “Public Water Bucket” that earn you and each participant
in your group $1 dollar. Thus, your total earnings for this hypothetical round would
be $15 dollars.
Here is another example:
If each person in your group demands zero water units, total demand is zero and 136
water units remain in the “Public Water Bucket.” You look at the “Returns from the
Public Water Bucket” handout to see that 136 units earn $23 for each participant in
your group. That means that for this hypothetical round you would earn zero dollars
from your Private Water Bucket and $23 from the groups “Public Water Bucket” so
that $23 would be your total earnings and the total earnings of each player in your
group.
Does anyone have any questions about this part of the experiment? Remember:
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You may choose any number of water units that you like for your “Private Water
Bucket.”
The number of water units that you get to keep depends on total water demand and
water supply.
Please write your ID number, shown on your “Decision and Earnings” handout, on
the form the experimenters are handing to you.
Please do not talk or communicate with any other participant. Please do not look
at the paperwork of other players and please keep all your paperwork and decisions
private. A folder has been provided for you to enclose your paperwork at the end of
each round.
Please fold your decision sheet in half, write your ID# on the outside of the sheet,
and hand it to one of the assistants.

B.3

Small Group – Communication

Welcome to this experiment on water use decision-making. Thank you for participating. We expect that this experiment will take approximately one hour.
This experiment will consist of several separate rounds. Your group will start each
round with 34 water units in your “Public Water Bucket.” During each round you
might choose to take some water from the “Public Water Bucket” and place it in
your “Private Water Bucket” or you may choose not to take any.
In each round you will be in a group of three people. We will not tell you who
the other members of your group are, and we will not tell any other participants
whether or not you are in their group. The members of your group will remain the
same throughout the experiment; therefore you will be in the same group of three
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participants for all rounds.
Your earnings for the experiment are based on the amount of water in your “Private
Water Bucket” and remaining water in the “Public Water Bucket.” You may place
any amount of water in your “Private Water Bucket” that you wish in whole amounts
(i.e. no fractions). However, if the total water demand of your group exceeds that
which is available in the “Public Water Bucket,” each member of your group receives
a prorated portion of the privately desired amount to put in their “Private Water
Bucket.”
Remaining water in the “Public Bucket” increases by a factor of two and each person
in your group gets an equal share. This means that the trick is to decide how much
water to put in your “Private Bucket” so that you earn as much money as you can.
[DISTRIBUTE THREE HANDOUTS NOW]
The handouts “Returns from the Public Water Bucket” and “Returns from the Private Water Bucket” show you how remaining water and water convert to earnings
expressed in dollars. At the end of each round, the experimenters will record water
you get to put in your “Private Water Bucket,” your groups remaining water in the
“Public Water Bucket,” and your payment for that round. For your records, you
may record the same information on the “Decision and Earnings” handout. That is,
you will record the water you get to keep and the associated earnings under “Your
Decision.” Under “Group Decision” you will record water remaining in the “Public
Water Bucket” and the associated earnings. You will add the private and public
earnings [columns (a) and (b)] to see the amount you earned on that round.
However, we will not pay you for every round. The bingo cage will contain one
number for each round you play. For example, if we complete ﬁve rounds, numbers
one through ﬁve will be placed in this bingo cage. The numbers I draw from the
cage will determine the rounds for which you will be paid. Since each number has an
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equal chance of being drawn, you should play each round as if it is a round that will
count towards your payment. We will draw two rounds and add your total earnings
from each round to determine your payment.
Here is how you will complete the ﬁrst round of this experiment:
Your group has 34 water units in the “Public Water Bucket.” You determine the
amount you would like to place in your “Private Water Bucket.” There is a chance
that the total demand of your group exceeds 34. If it does, we will prorate the
individually desired amount and let you know how many water units you get to
keep.
[DISTRIBUTE DISCUSSION BOARD SHEET TO GROUPS]
Before you decide how much water you would like to place in your “Private Water
Bucket” you may write on the “Discussion Board” one or two sentences that you
would like for the your group members to read. The “Discussion Board” for each
round is in your folder. Please write legibly so your group can read your comments.
We will photo copy your comments onto a single “Discussion Board” sheet that only
you and your group members will see. Each group will have their own “Discussion
Board.” Only you will know which comments belong to you, all comments will
remain anonymous.
Here is how we prorate when water demand exceeds water supply:
First we determine the total water demand for your group by adding the individual
decisions. Then we divide the available supply 34, by the total demand to get a
ratio. We multiply that ratio by your individual decision and that is how much you
get to keep.
That sounds like a lot of math: dont worry. We will calculate that for you and let
you know how much of your desired water you get to keep.
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Here is an example of how this works:
If each person in your group demands 15 water units, total demand is 45, which is
greater than the available 34 units. The experimenter prorates the amount that each
player gets to keep and reports to you that you get 11 water units. You look at your
“Returns from the Private Water Bucket” handout and if, for example, it said that
11 units earn you $14 dollars your “Private Bucket Earnings” would be $14. One
unit remains in the “Public Water Bucket.” That earns you and each participant in
your group $1 dollar. Thus, your total earnings for this hypothetical round would
be $15 dollars.
Here is another example:
If each person in your group demands zero water units, total demand is zero and 34
water units remain in the “Public Water Bucket.” You look at the “Returns from
the Public Water Bucket” handout to see that 34 units earn $23 for each participant
in your group. That means that for this hypothetical round you would earn zero
dollars from your “Private Water Bucket” and $23 from the groups “Public Water
Bucket” so that $23 would be your total earnings and the total earnings of each
player in your group.
Does anyone have any questions about this part of the experiment? Remember:
The assistants are handing you your groups Round 1 “Discussion Board.” Please
read the comments and make your water decision.
You may choose any number of water units that you like for your “Private Water
Bucket.”
The number of water units that you get to keep depends on total water demand and
water supply.
Please write your ID number, shown on your “Decision and Earnings” handout, on
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the form the experimenters are handing to you.
Please do not talk or communicate with any other participant. Please do not look
at the paperwork of other players and please keep all your paperwork and decisions
private. A folder has been provided for you to enclose your paperwork at the end of
each round.
After you have made your decision, please write any comments you would like to
make for the Round 2 “Discussion Board.”
Please fold your decision sheet in half, write your ID# on the outside of the sheet,
and hand it to one of the assistants.

B.4

Large Group – Communication

Welcome to this experiment on water use decision-making. Thank you for participating. We expect that this experiment will take approximately one hour.
This experiment will consist of several separate rounds. Your group will start each
round with 136 water units in your “Public Water Bucket.” During each round you
might choose to take some water from the “Public Water Bucket” and place it in
your “Private Water Bucket” or you may choose not to take any.
Your earnings for the experiment are based on the amount of water in your “Private
Water Bucket” and remaining water in the “Public Water Bucket.” You may place
any amount of water in your “Private Water Bucket” that you wish in whole amounts
(i.e. no fractions). However, if the total water demand of your group exceeds that
which is available in the “Public Water Bucket,” each member of your group receives
a prorated portion of the privately desired amount to put in their Private Water
Bucket.
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Remaining water in the “Public Bucket” increases by a factor of two and each person
in your group gets an equal share. This means that the trick is to decide how much
water to put in your “Private Bucket” so that you earn as much money as you can.
[DISTRIBUTE THREE HANDOUTS NOW]
The handouts “Returns from the Public Water Bucket” and “Returns from the Private Water Bucket” show you how remaining water and water convert to earnings
expressed in dollars. You will record on the “Decision and Earnings” handout three
pieces of important information. You will record the water you get to keep and the
associated earnings under “Your Decision.” Under Group Decision you will record
water remaining in the “Public Water Bucket” and the associated earnings. You will
add the private and public earnings [columns (a) and (b)] to see the amount you
earned on that round.
However, we will not pay you for every round. The bingo cage will contain one
number for each round you play. For example, if we complete ﬁve rounds, numbers
one through ﬁve will be placed in this bingo cage. The numbers I draw from the
cage will determine the rounds for which you will be paid. Since each number has an
equal chance of being drawn, you should play each round as if it is a round that will
count towards your payment. We will draw two rounds and add your total earnings
from each round to determine your payment.
Here is how you will complete the ﬁrst round of this experiment:
Your group has 136 water units in the “Public Water Bucket.” You determine the
amount you would like to place in your “Private Water Bucket.” There is a chance
that the total demand of your group exceeds 136. If it does, we will prorate the
individually desired amount and let you know how many water units you get to
keep.
[DISTRIBUTE DISCUSSION BOARD SHEET TO GROUPS]
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Before you decide how much water you would like to place in your “Private Water
Bucket” you may write on the “Discussion Board” one or two sentences that you
would like for the your group members to read. The “Discussion Board” for each
round is in your folder. Please write legibly so your group can read your comments.
We will photo copy your comments onto a single “Discussion Board” sheet that only
you and your group members will see. Each group will have their own “Discussion
Board.” Only you will know which comments belong to you, all comments will
remain anonymous.
Here is how we prorate when water demand exceeds water supply:
First we determine the total water demand for your group by adding the individual
decisions. Then we divide the available supply 136, by the total demand to get a
ratio. We multiply that ratio by your individual decision and that is how much you
get to keep.
That sounds like a lot of math: dont worry. We will calculate that for you and let
you know how many of your desired water units you get to keep.
Here is an example of how this works:
If each person in your group demands 15 water units, total demand is 180, which
is greater than the available 136 units. The experimenter prorates the amount that
each player gets to keep and reports to you that you get 11 water units. You look at
your “Returns from the Private Water Bucket” handout and if, for example, it said
that 11 units earn you $14 dollars your “Private Bucket Earnings” would be $14.
Four units remain in the “Public Water Bucket” that earn you and each participant
in your group $1 dollar. Thus, your total earnings for this hypothetical round would
be $15 dollars.
Here is another example:
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If each person in your group demands zero water units, total demand is zero and 136
water units remain in the “Public Water Bucket.” You look at the “Returns from the
Public Water Bucket” handout to see that 136 units earn $23 for each participant in
your group. That means that for this hypothetical round you would earn zero dollars
from your Private Water Bucket and $23 from the groups “Public Water Bucket” so
that $23 would be your total earnings and the total earnings of each player in your
group.
Does anyone have any questions about this part of the experiment? Remember:
You may choose any number of water units that you like for your “Private Water
Bucket.”
The number of water units that you get to keep depends on total water demand and
water supply.
Please write your ID number, shown on your “Decision and Earnings” handout, on
the form the experimenters are handing to you.
Please do not talk or communicate with any other participant. Please do not look
at the paperwork of other players and please keep all your paperwork and decisions
private. A folder has been provided for you to enclose your paperwork at the end of
each round.
Please fold your decision sheet in half, write your ID# on the outside of the sheet,
and hand it to one of the assistants.
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Figure C.1: Decision and Earnings Handout
GROUP
5

KEEP THIS SHEET PRIVATE

ID#
52301

Decision and Earnings Sheet
Your Decision
Round

Water You
Keep

Private Bucket
Earnings
(a)

Group Decision
Water
Remaining

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Payment made on rounds

and
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Public Bucket
Earnings
(b)

Total Earnings
(a) + (b)
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Figure C.2: Decision Round Sheet Large Group
Round 1

ID#: _____________

Please write your ID number, shown on your Decision and Earnings handout, on the ID
line above.
The table shows the total amount of water units available to you and your other group
members in the Public Water Bucket. Please indicate how many of those water units you
wish to place in your Private Water Bucket.
ENTER YOUR DECISION HERE

Public Bucket Water

136

Private Water Bucket

When you are done, fold the paper in half and hand it to one of the experiment assistants.
It will be returned to you with the following information completed.
THE EXPERIMENTERS WILL FILL THIS INFORMATION IN FOR YOU SO
YOU CAN ENTER IT ON YOUR DECISIONS AND EARNINGS SHEET
UNITS
Water You Keep in Private Water Bucket
Water Remaining in Public Water Bucket
Total payment for this round
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EARNINGS ($)
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Figure C.3: Decision Round Sheet Small Group – No Information
Round 1

ID#: _____________

Please write your ID number, shown on your Decision and Earnings handout, on the ID
line above.
The table shows the total amount of water units available to you and your other group
members in the Public Water Bucket. Please indicate how many of those water units you
wish to place in your Private Water Bucket.
ENTER YOUR DECISION HERE

Public Bucket Water

34

Private Water Bucket

When you are done, fold the paper in half and hand it to one of the experiment assistants.
It will be returned to you with the following information completed.
THE EXPERIMENTERS WILL FILL THIS INFORMATION IN FOR YOU SO
YOU CAN ENTER IT ON YOUR DECISIONS AND EARNINGS SHEET
UNITS
Water You Keep in Private Water Bucket
Water Remaining in Public Water Bucket
Total payment for this round
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EARNINGS ($)
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Figure C.4: Decision Round Sheet Small Group – Information
Round 6

ID#: _____________

Please write your ID number, shown on your Decision and Earnings handout, on the ID
line above.
The table shows the total amount of water units available to you and your other group
members in the Public Water Bucket. Please indicate how many of those water units you
wish to place in your Private Water Bucket.
ENTER YOUR DECISION HERE

Public Bucket Water

34

Private Water Bucket

When you are done, fold the paper in half and hand it to one of the experiment assistants.
It will be returned to you with the following information completed.
THE EXPERIMENTERS WILL FILL THIS INFORMATION IN FOR YOU SO
YOU CAN ENTER IT ON YOUR DECISIONS AND EARNINGS SHEET
UNITS
Water You Keep in Private Water Bucket
Water Remaining in Public Water Bucket
Total payment for this round

133

EARNINGS ($)
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U. Fischbacher, S. Gächter, and E. Fehr. Are people conditionally cooperative?
Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters, 71(3):397–404, 2001.

137

REFERENCES

M.E. Fischer, B. Irlenbusch, and A. Sadrieh. An intergenerational common pool
resource experiment. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 48
(2):811–836, 2004.
R. Gardner, E. Ostrom, and J.M. Walker. The nature of common-pool resource
problems. Rationality and Society, 2(3):335, 1990.
K. C. Gibbs. Price variable in residential water demand models. Water Resources
Research, 14(1), 1978.
M. Gisser and D.A. Sanchez. Competition versus optimal control in groundwater
pumping. Water Resources Research, 16(4):638–642, 1980.
H. Scott Gordon. The economic theory of a common property resource: The ﬁshery.
Journal of Political Economy, 62(2):124–142, 1954.
J.P. Gould. Adjustment Costs in the Theory of Investment of the Firm. Review of
Economic Studies, 35(1):47–55, 1968.
E.M. Gramlich. Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay. Journal of Economic
Literature, 32(3):1176–1196, 1994.
R.C. Griﬃn. Eﬀective Water Pricing. Journal of the American Water Resources
Association, 37(5):1335–1347, 2001.
LE Hahn. 2009. Water Strategist, 2009.
Steve H. Hanke. Pricing as a conservation tool: An economist’s dream come true. In
David Holtz and Scott Sebastian, editors, Municipal Water Systems: The Challenge for Urban Resources Management. Indiana University Press, Bloomington,
1978.

138

REFERENCES

Jason K Hansen. Optimal water-utility infrastructure investment: Testing eﬀects of
population, capital, and policy on the decision. Chapter 2 “Urban Water Policy:
Infrastructure, Scarcity, and Conservation”, 2009a.
Jason K Hansen. The Econmics of Community Water System Regionalization. Working Paper, 2009b.
A. Herr, R. Gardner, and J.M. Walker. An experimental study of time-independent
and time-dependent externalities in the commons. Games and Economic Behavior,
19(1):77–96, 1997.
V.C. Ipe and S.B. Bhagwat. Chicagos water market: dynamics of demand, prices
and scarcity rents. Applied Economics, 34(17):2157–2163, 2002.
R.M. Isaac and J.M. Walker. Group size eﬀects in public goods provision: The
voluntary contributions mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(1):
179–199, February 1988a.
R.M. Isaac and J.M. Walker. Communication and free-riding behavior: The voluntary contribution mechanism. Economic Inquiry, 26(4):585–608, 1988b.
R.M. Isaac, J.M. Walker, and A.W. Williams. Group size and the voluntary provision
of public goods: experimental evidence utilizing large groups. Journal of Public
Economics, 54(1):1–36, 1994.
M.W. Jenkins, J.R. Lund, and R.E. Howitt. Using economic loss functions to value
urban water scarcity in California. Journal American Water Works Association,
95(2):58–70, 2003.
J.L. Jordan. Externalities, Water Prices, and Water Transfers. Journal of the American Water Resources Association, 35(5):1007–1013, 1999.
C. Keser and R. Gardner. Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common
pool resource game. International Journal of Game Theory, 28(2):241–252, 1999.

139

REFERENCES

K.C. Knapp, M. Weinberg, R. Howitt, and J.F. Posnikoﬀ. Water transfers, agriculture, and groundwater management: a dynamic economic analysis. Journal of
Environmental Management, 67(4):291–301, 2003.
H. Kohyama. Select Discount Rates for Budgetary Purposes. Brieﬁng Paper, 2006.
Lawrence Kuss. The Albuquerque Aquifer. Hydrogeology GO571 – Term Project,
Prof. Marcia Schulmeister, April 2005. URL http://academic.emporia.edu/
schulmem/hydro/TERM%20PROJECTS/Kuss/Hydrogeo%20Term%20Project.html.
W.E. Martin, H.M. Ingram, N.K. Laney, and A.H. Griﬃn. Saving water in a desert
city. Resources for the Future, Washington D.C, 1984.
C.F. Mason and O.R. Phillips. Mitigating the tragedy of the commons through
cooperation: an experimental evaluation. Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management, 34(2):148–172, 1997.
C.F. Mason and S. Polasky. The optimal number of ﬁrms in the commons: a dynamic
approach. Canadian Journal of Economics, pages 1143–1160, 1997.
D. McAda and P. Barroll. Simulation of ground-water ﬂow in the middle rio grande
between cochiti and san acacia, new mexico. 2002.
J.E.T. Moncur. Drought Episodes Management: The Role of Price. Journal of the
American Water Resources Association, 25(3):499–505, 1989.
J.E.T. Moncur and R.L. Pollock. Scarcity rents for water: A valuation and pricing
model. Land Economics, 64(1):62–72, 1988.
E. Moxnes. Not only the tragedy of the commons: misperceptions of bioeconomics.
Management Science, pages 1234–1248, 1998.
MRGWA. Middle rio grande water budget: Where it goes, and comes from, and how
much. Technical report, Middle Rior Grande Water Assembly, 1999.

140

REFERENCES

A.H. Munnell. Why Has Productivity Growth Declined? Productivity and Public
Investment. New England Economic Review, 30(January/February):3–22, 1990.
A.H. Munnell. Infrastructure Investment and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(4):189–198, 1992.
Wayne Niehus, Jeﬀ Quimby, and Lars Sandberg. Ten-Year Capital Improvement
Program For Fiscal Years 2010-1029. Annual report, Contra Costa Water District,
2008.
S.M. Olmstead, W. Michael Hanemann, and R.N. Stavins. Water demand under alternative price structures. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
54(2):181–198, 2007.
T.R. Palfrey and H. Rosenthal. Testing for eﬀects of cheap talk in a public goods
game with private information. Games and economic behavior, 3(2):183–220, 1991.
A.M. Pereira. Is All Public Capital Created Equal?

Review of Economics and

Statistics, 82(3):513–518, 2000.
James E. Rauch. Bureaucracy, infrastructure, and economic growth: Evidence from
u.s. cities during the progressive era. American Economic Review, 85(4):968–979,
September 1995.
M.E. Renwick and S.O. Archibald. Demand Side Management Policies for Residential
Water Use: Who Bears the Conservation Burden? Land Economics, 74:343–359,
1998.
M.E. Renwick and R.D. Green. Do residential water demand side management
policies measure up? An analysis of eight California water agencies. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 40(1):37–55, 2000.

141

REFERENCES

S.J. Rubio. Adjustment costs, uncertainty, and the theory of investment: The case
of non-renewable natural resources. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 23(2):139–153, 1992.
S. Saunders, C.H. Montgomery, T. Easley, T. Spencer, and Natural Resources Defense Council. Hotter and Drier: The West’s Changed Climate. Rocky Mountain
Climate Organization; NRDC, 2008.
G.R. Sloggett and H.P. Mapp. An Analysis of Rising Irrigation Costs in the Great
Plains. American Water Resources Association, 20(2):229–233, 1984.
N. Tarui, C.F. Mason, S. Polasky, and G. Ellis. Cooperation in the commons with
unobservable actions. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55
(1):37–51, 2008.
USGS.

Ground water watch.

URL http://groundwaterwatch.usgs.gov/

AWLSites.asp?S=350824106375301.
J.M. Walker and R. Gardner. Probabilistic destruction of common-pool resources:
Experimental evidence. The Economic Journal, 102(414):1149–1161, September
1992.
J.M. Walker, R. Gardner, and E. Ostrom. Rent dissipation in a limited-access
common-pool resource: Experimental evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 19(3):203–211, 1990.
WIN. Clean & Safe Water for the 21st Century: A Renewed National Commitment
to Water and Wastewater Infrastructure. Water Infrastructure Network, 2000a.
WIN. Water Infrastructure Now: Recommendations for Clean and Safe Water in
the 21st Century. Water Infrastructure Network, 2000b.
R.A. Young. Why are there so few transactions among water users?
Journal of Agricultural Economics, pages 1143–1151, 1986.

142

American

